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ABSTRACT 
 
ESSAYS ON FOOD ECONOMICS STUDIES 
 
 
SEPTEMBER 2018 
 
HONGLI WEI 
 
B.A., SICHUAN UNIVERSITY 
 
M.A., XIAMEN UNIVERSITY 
 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Emily Y. Wang 
 
In this dissertation research, we first study how legislations governing nutrients in 
food production have influenced consumer behaviors and firm choices. Taking margarine 
and spreads as the product category of choice, Chapter 1 analyzes how consumers and 
firms responded to the 2006 implementation of the NLEA trans fats labeling guidelines. 
Our results show that product offerings with “trans fat free” labels increased shortly after 
2006, while consumer purchases of products with “trans fat free” labels also surged 
promptly after the labeling policy was implemented. However, in general, we find the 
short-term effects of trans fat labeling to be significantly larger than the long-term effects.  
In Chapter 2, we extend the previous research in estimating consumers’ 
willingness to pay for trans fat using scanner data on purchases of microwavable popcorn 
from 2006 to 2014, after mandatory labeling was instituted. Product-level multinomial 
logit model results suggest that trans fat content on average increases consumer demand, 
vi 
with significant regional preference heterogeneity. Consumers in the Northeast have a 
higher preference for trans fat popcorn than in the other three regions. In addition, we 
find evidence to show that this positive preference for trans fat has become stronger since 
the 2006 mandatory labeling rule, implying that consumers value the taste of trans fat 
over trans fat health concerns. 
Chapter 3 explores the WIC infant formula rebate program, which awards a 
single-source contract to the firm that offers the lowest net bid price. We find different 
spillover patterns by comparing three types of formula: top WIC infant formula, non-
WIC infant formula, and toddler formula. In particular, immediately after the contract 
change, there is a significant increase in market share for all three types of formula for 
the winning manufacturer due to greater shelf space, better product placement, and the 
advantages of carrying WIC labels. Our empirical results suggest that losing 
manufacturers still enjoy a spillover privilege in the toddler formula market from 
consumers’ brand loyalty. Over time, the spillover effect increases the winner’s share and 
decreases the losers’ shares for all infant formula, which may reflect a combined impact 
of recommendations from physicians and WIC participants. Lastly, we observe that 
winning manufacturers increase the price of top WIC and all other infant formula and 
decrease the price of toddler formula over time. The spillover effect allows losing 
manufacturers to increase prices for all three types of formula at least 2 years after a 
contract change. 
vii 
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CHAPTER 1  
ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF TRANS FAT LABELING POLICY ON CONSUMERS AND 
PRODUCERS 
1.1 Introduction 
The impact of changes in food labeling policy on food consumption depends on how 
market participants —both firms and consumers—react to the changes across all products in the 
market. We investigate how both responded to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s 2006 
rule mandating that the quantity of trans fats in food products be separately labeled on the 
mandatory Nutrition Facts Panel across an entire differentiated product category. Using a 
longitudinal data set tracking both product offerings and consumer purchases in the market for 
margarine and spreads for over a decade, we analyze how product mix and consumer purchase 
behaviors were influenced by the new regulatory requirement. We find that the number of 
products bearing voluntary “trans-fat-free” labels increased after the labeling regulation was 
implemented. However, a large number of the newly introduced products exited the market 
within five years. As a result, the FDA’s 2006 rule had a stronger short-run than long-run effect 
on product offerings. Even after the introduction of additional “trans-fat-free” labeled products, 
such products remained only a small percentage of margarine and spreads product offerings, 
increasing from a pre-regulation level of 2.3% of the market to a peak of 6.5% in 2007 before 
dropping to 3.1% by 2011. In addition to firm response, we examine demand-side reactions to 
the 2006 rule and find that consumers significantly increased their expenditures on “trans-fat-
free” labeled products soon after the labeling changes were implemented, increasing from about 
1.2% of the market in 2001 to a peak of 5.9% in 2007, before returning to 1.8% in 2011. We 
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further explore variations in responses across different demographic characteristics. Although 
long-run effects are small, the market for “trans-fat-free” labeled margarine and spreads settled 
into a new equilibrium with a somewhat higher level of products in the market than prior to the 
2006 rule taking effect and a somewhat higher share of expenditures in the category. Overall, our 
category-wide analysis of both firm and consumer behavior indicates that the effects of the 
labeling policy change were smaller in the longer run in this market than would be indicated by 
an analysis of only new product introductions in response to the policy change. 
Trans fat is a type of unsaturated fat uncommon in nature but manufactured artificially as 
a byproduct in the production of processed vegetable fats. Starting in the 1950s, trans fat, in the 
form of margarine, became a popular replacement for butter. Partially hydrogenated vegetable 
oils have remained a significant ingredient in the U.S. diet, particularly through foods such as 
margarine and spreads, cookies, and french fries throughout the second half of the 20th century 
(Valenzuela & Morgado, 1999). By the early 1990s, mounting evidence showed that trans fat is 
associated with an increased incidence of coronary artery disease and is associated with 380,000 
deaths and $108.9 billion in medical costs in the U.S. every year (Murphy, Xu, & Kochanek, 
2013; Heidenreich et al., 2011). In the absence of mandatory nutrition labeling, the amount of 
trans fat in food products is a credence attribute for consumers, meaning that consumers cannot 
evaluate the level of trans fat even after consumption. Information on trans fat content is 
asymmetric, with consumers being less informed than producers.  
Efforts have been made in the U.S. to reduce trans fat consumption, including product 
liability lawsuits and banning the use of trans fat in restaurants in some jurisdictions. The U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) provides detailed information on trans fat to educate and 
enhance the general public’s understanding of trans fats and to encourage the consumption of 
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trans-fat-free (“TFF”) foods. In 1999, the FDA proposed to change labeling policy to include 
information on trans fats on the required Nutrition Facts Panel and to further regulate the use of 
voluntary TFF claims on food products (Federal Register, 1999). In its final rule, issued in 2003 
and taking effect in 2006, the FDA mandated that Nutrition Facts Panels include a separate entry 
for trans fats, while at the same time withdrawing its proposed further regulation of voluntary 
TFF claims (Federal Register, 2003). Recently, trans fat once again took center stage when the 
FDA mandated that partially hydrogenated oils, the primary dietary source of artificial trans fat 
in processed foods, be removed from products entirely by 2018 (FDA, 2015). 
From a policy perspective, the overall impact of changes in food labeling policy on food 
consumption depends on how market participants —both firms and consumers—react to the 
changes across all products in the market and over time. This impact may vary across product 
categories. Research to date on the impact of labeling changes such as adding trans fat content to 
the Nutrition Facts Panel has focused on changes in new product introductions. While important, 
this research does not capture overall movements in the supply of and demand for food products 
across entire, differentiated product categories. To capture these market-wide outcomes, we 
study the impact of the 2006 mandatory labeling of trans fat on the Nutrition Facts Panel (the 
“2006 rule”) on an entire product category. Using a large-scale longitudinal dataset, we analyze 
changes in both supplier and consumer behavior in the entire margarine and spreads category 
from 2001-2011, five years before and six years after the 2006 rule.  
Tracking both product introductions and existing products, we find the mandatory 
labeling of trans fat impacted both product offerings and consumer purchases in the market for 
margarine and spreads. During the sample period, product offerings with TFF claims increased, 
as did household consumption of these products. However, similar to effects found for other 
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popular claims (Martinez 2013), both effects were stronger in the short than the long run. The 
market for margarine and spreads reached a new equilibrium with somewhat higher levels of 
TFF product offerings and purchases at the end of the sample period in 2011 than in periods 
before labeling took effect. These results suggest that the evaluation of the impact of labeling 
policy changes should consider changes in firm and consumer behavior across entire product 
categories and over time. 
1.2 Literature Review  
The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA), passed by the U.S. Congress in 1990 
and implemented in 1994, required the inclusion of a detailed Nutrition Facts Panel on most 
packaged foods. Prior to the NLEA, disclosure of nutrition information was not required unless a 
nutrition claim was made on the packaging, although all nutrition-related disclosure, whether 
voluntary or mandatory, had to follow a prescribed format. After the NLEA, all food packages 
were required to disclose calories, total fat, cholesterol, sodium, carbohydrates (including dietary 
fiber and sugars), protein, and selected vitamins and minerals. In addition, the NLEA regulates 
the use of voluntary nutritional claims (e.g., “low fat” or “sugar-free”) as well as general health 
claims (e.g., “high cholesterol is a risk factor in the development of coronary heart disease”).  
Researchers (Capps, 1992; Caswell & Padberg, 1992; Zarkin & Anderson, 1992) have 
long been interested in the impact of the NLEA policy on product offerings and on household 
consumption. Over the years, a considerable literature on nutrition labeling has accumulated, 
including studies concerning the Nutrition Facts Panel as well as voluntary nutrient content and 
health claims (Cowburn & Stockley, 2005; Drichoutis, Lazaridis, & Nayga, 2006). 
In general, the literature suggests that nutrition labeling rules are conditionally effective 
in influencing both consumers and food producers in many aspects. Mandatory nutrition labeling 
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leads to an increase in information available to consumers. Surveys conducted by the Food 
Marketing Institute (FMI) indicate that at least 43% and possibly as many as 78% of consumers 
were aware of the presence of the Nutrition Facts Panel (FMI 1995a and b) shortly after the 
NLEA’s implementation. That awareness in some cases translates to practical consequences: 
more motivated and less skeptical consumers acquire more information from the label 
(Moorman, 1996). Caswell, Ning, Liu, and Mojduszka (2003) found that the NLEA improved 
information quality by standardizing the usage of voluntary nutritional label claims. Mandatory 
nutrition labeling could potentially benefit consumers by reducing search costs and increasing 
product knowledge (Berning et al., 2010). Crutchfield, Kuchler, & Variyam (2001) estimated the 
benefits of nutrition labeling rules on raw meat and poultry products that reduced intake of fat 
and cholesterol to be $62 to $125 million annually.  Variyam and Cawley (2008) estimated that 
the total monetary benefit of the decrease in body weight due to the NLEA is $63 to $166 billion 
over a 20-year period—far in excess of its costs.  
A large body of literature has found that nutrition labeling influences consumer 
valuations and perceptions of a product leading to changes in purchasing decisions if the 
substitution effect between nutrition and taste is small (Teisl & Levy, 1997). Drichoutis, 
Lazaridis, & Nayga (2006) argued that consumers use nutrition labels when shopping mainly to 
avoid negative nutrients in food products, while Mathios (2000) found salad dressings with the 
highest fat levels experienced a significant decline in sales following the NLEA. In line with 
these findings, other research has found that consumers may respond to nutritional labels by 
altering their food choices as a result of their increased understanding of food content (Ippolito & 
Mathios, 1994; Marietta, Welshimer, & Anderson, 1999).  
Positive effects of nutrition labeling regulation on consumer behavior have recently been 
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reported in other countries as well. For instance, Leathwood et al. (2007) argued that European 
legislation on nutrition and health claims implemented in January 2007 can help consumers 
make well-informed food choices. Studying the same set of legislation, Gracia, Loureiro, and 
Hayga (2007) found that older and more educated consumers are more likely to consider the 
regulation as beneficial. Balcombe, Fraser, and Di Falco (2010) found that UK consumers are 
willing to pay more to avoid foods with “red” nutrients, especially salt and saturated fats, in 
response to the UK nutritional food label Traffic Light System. Barreiro-Hurlé, Gracia, & de-
Magistris (2010) used a multivariate Probit model to study the effect of nutrition facts panels and 
nutrition/health claims on consumption through survey data obtained in Spain. They found that 
nutrition information increases consumption of healthy foods. However, the impact of nutrition 
labeling may be limited if, for example, it does not significantly change consumption 
(Mojduszka, Caswell, & Harris, 2001) or the search and recall of nutrition information by 
consumers (Balasubramanian & Cole, 2002). 
Research on nutrition and health claims yield somewhat similar findings. For instance, 
Nocella and Kennedy (2012) pointed out the complexity of how consumers are influenced by 
health claims. After examining several potential impact factors, including personal 
characteristics, food features, and the wording of claims, they found that enhancing the 
communication of scientific evidence could reduce consumer confusion about food health 
claims. Wezemael et al. (2014) found that consumer preferences for nutrition and health claims 
on lean beef steak vary across countries. 
In addition to influencing consumer demand, nutrition labeling rules encourage producers 
to use voluntary label claims, create new products, and reformulate existing products. For 
example, research focused specifically on newly introduced products with trans fat labeling has 
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shown significant responses by food processors. Unnevehr & Jagmanaite (2008) argued that the 
2006 rule created incentives for the food industry to reduce trans fat content. They showed that 
the number of new TFF-labeled products increased greatly from 64 in 2003 to 544 in 2006, and 
that the number of firms introducing TFF-labeled products increased from 139 in 2004 to 318 in 
2006. Van Camp, Hooker, & Lin (2012) suggested that the 2006 rule resulted in a decreased use 
of partially hydrogenated vegetable oil in newly introduced chip products, without a 
corresponding increase in saturated fat content. Hooker & Downs (2013, 2014) found that, while 
in 2006, the main fat ingredient used in cookies in the U.S. was partially hydrogenated vegetable 
oils, by 2012 it had shifted to palm oil, resulting in a nearly 50% reduction in trans fat used in 
newly introduced cookies between 2006 and 2012. Rahkovsky, Martinez, & Kuchler (2012) 
found a decrease in trans fat and an increase in the use of TFF claims in new food products, 
including snacks, bakery products, and soup, from 2005 to 2010. However, the analysis of new 
product introductions cannot characterize developments across entire product categories in 
response to changes in labeling policy. 
Martinez (2013) argued that as food labeling regulations take effect, competition among 
food manufacturers encourages the use of labels to advertise the nutritional quality of healthier 
products. This result does not seem to hold, however, in the earlier time period of the 1990s. 
Moorman, Ferraro, & Huber (2012) conducted a cross-sectional study on the effect on product 
offerings as a result of the 1994 NLEA during the period 1990 to 1996. Examining the 
nutritional profiles of 30 product categories, the authors found evidence that the average 
nutritional quality of products regulated by the NLEA decreased compared to those not 
regulated. They suggest that, among other potential causes, one factor driving the decrease had to 
do with consumer taste. Consumers select products based on their taste instead of nutrient 
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quality; companies respond by offering products with better taste that have lower nutritional 
value on the margin. However, the authors also found that a subset of the new products 
introduced after the NLEA were more nutritional than existing products.  
While Moorman, Ferraro, & Huber’s (2012) study is similar to our own, the authors 
examined only the supply side of the market by concentrating on products offered; they did not 
analyze demand-side effects. Such one-sided studies can be misleading, since changes to the 
products offered in a given category may not correspond to changes, if any, in consumer choices. 
In other words, while the products offered may have grown worse in nutrition in the early post-
NLEA period, consumer choices may remain as healthy or become healthier than before, 
because consumers may still choose from the healthier foods available.  
Overall, relatively little research on changes in labeling policy has focused on changes 
both in the supply of product offerings and on consumer demand across entire categories of food 
products. An exception is Mojduszka et al. (1999), who measured nutritional quality changes in 
product offerings in five food categories: entrees, soup, salted snacks, cookies, and processed 
meats and bacon in the mid-1990s. They found no significant change in the average nutritional 
quality of products within each category upon adoption of the NLEA. Their preliminary analysis 
also suggested that consumer purchases within these categories are weighted toward products 
with lower nutrition indexes. In our study, we focus on both supply- (product offerings) and 
demand- (consumer purchases) side changes in the entire product category of margarine and 
spreads before and after the 2006 rule. This approach addresses the overall question of the 
impact of labeling policy changes on food markets. 
1.3 Data Description  
The market for margarine and spreads is predominantly comprised of sticks, spreads, and 
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spray products. Because butter is made mainly from natural milk fat, which is free of trans fat, 
only margarine and spreads products, and not real butter products, were affected by the 2006 
rule.  
Our data set derives from two longitudinal panels, a retail panel and a household panel, 
both provided by Information Resources, Inc. The panels span eleven years, from the first week 
of 2001 to the last week of 2011, in weekly intervals. In addition, a panel on product attributes 
details the characteristics of each UPC (a unique universal code associated with each product-
packaging combination) in each year. Furthermore, the demographics of all households in the 
household panel are reported. Together, these data capture not only the composition of the entire 
market for margarine and spreads by product attribute, but also allow for the analysis of 
consumer uptake of available products. Thus, our data set provides a complete picture of market 
changes occurring before and after the 2006 rule. 
The retail panel documents weekly sales and prices from all margarine and spreads1 sold 
in participating grocery stores across all major metropolitan statistical areas. Together, the 
sample of grocery stores (e.g., Kroger, Stop & Shop) accounts for roughly 10% of all grocery 
stores in the U.S. For each UPC code in each store in each week, we observe the total revenue 
and total quantity sold, as well as whether the product is experiencing a temporary price 
reduction, is on display in-store, or is otherwise featured in-store. Tracking all products sold by 
UPC for over a decade, we can identify introductions of new products, major reformulations of 
previously existing products, and product exits. In total, we observe 39,323,839 instances (UPCs 
on a weekly basis) in the panel.  
For each product identified by its UPC code in the retail and household panels, we 
                                                 
1 We do not observe butter-only products; instead, all products in the sample are either butter substitutes or butter 
imitation products. 
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observe a set of attributes. These include its brand, product type (e.g. margarine), packaging (e.g. 
plastic tub), form (e.g. stick), main ingredient (e.g. vegetable oil), calorie level (e.g. zero 
calorie2), and most importantly fat claims (e.g. “TFF”), which identifies any claims made on the 
package with regard to fat. However, we do not directly observe the Nutrition Facts Panel 
associated with each UPC. The set of product attributes are tracked annually from 2001 to 2011, 
covering the entire retail panel. This allows us to observe in which year new products are 
introduced, their duration in the market, and their exit from the market if discontinued.  
We analyze in particular fat-related claims appearing on product labels, which take a 
variety of forms in addition to the TFF claim on the labels of margarine and spreads, including 
“50% less saturated fat,” and “70% less fat.” Not all products in this category have labels that 
contain fat-related claims. In fact, 18.5% of products available have no fat-related claims. For 
these products, the “fat claims” variable is labeled as “missing.”3 Here we concentrate on 
products with TFF claims. All other label claims, including those which make no claims as to fat 
content, are aggregated into the group “no TFF claims.”  
We make use of the household panel data to analyze how households reacted to the 2006 
rule. The panel documents purchases of margarine and spreads on a weekly basis for an average 
of 4,758 households in one of two locations, one in New England and the other in the Great 
Lakes region. For each household in the panel, we observe the volume and price of all purchases 
of margarine and spreads—data comprising a total of a little over 400,000 purchases. In addition, 
household demographic information is observed, including annual income, education of the head 
of the household, family size, presence of children, and race.  
Table 1.1 shows summary statistics of demographic variables and the number of 
                                                 
2 We identify zero calories based on observed zero calorie claims reported in the data. 
3 All claims on a product’s packaging are recorded in the data. As a result, if a product makes no claims on its 
packaging, it is recorded as “missing” in the data. 
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households in the household panel by year. Nominal annual household income is observed as 
falling into one of twelve income brackets, the lowest denoting $0 – $9,999 and the highest 
denoting $100,000 and above. For the summary statistics provided in table 1.1, we use the upper 
bound of each bracket in computing the average and standard deviation. The household income 
reported is representative of the U.S. population, with the sample average of $61,925 comparable 
to the 2011 U.S. average of $69,821, according to the U.S. Census. The education level of the 
head of the household is observed in eight levels, from “some grade school” to “post-graduate 
work.” While we analyze how households in each education level respond to the new NLEA 
rules, in table 1.1 we present only the percentage of households with college degrees. On 
average, around 24% of the heads of household sampled have completed college degrees, which 
conforms to the national average of 22%. Household size ranges from one to six members, with 
an average of 2.5, also on par with the U.S. population. The variable “presence of children” 
shows the percentage of households in the sample with children. Approximately 20% of all 
households sampled have at least one child. Households of all races are present in the sample; 
however, a large majority of the households are Caucasian.  
One caveat regarding the household panel data is the household attrition that has occurred 
in recent years causing the size of the panel to decrease gradually. However, the attrition was pro 
rata across demographics. As a result, the distributions of demographic variables do not vary 
much over the sample period. A second caveat is that the sample was drawn predominantly from 
regions with relatively low racial diversity, and as a consequence the majority of households 
sampled are Caucasian. However, we are not aware of research documenting racial biases in the 
consumption of margarine and spreads.  
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Table 1.1 Summary Statistics of Demographic Variables in Household Panel Data by Year, 
2001-2011 
 
Variable Income College Degree Household Size 
Presence of 
Children 
Caucasian Sample Size 
2001 
52,879.86 
(43099.37) 
21.00% 
2.55 
(1.29) 
24.23% 91.08% 6846 
2002 
53,152.63 
(43540.94) 
20.57% 
2.54 
(1.29) 
23.92% 95.17% 7573 
2003 55,604.99 
(44567.09) 
23.78% 2.53 
(1.28) 
25.07% 98.85% 5291 
2004 56,409.03 
(45365.26) 
22.96% 2.54 
(1.28) 
24.48% 98.86% 4837 
2005 57,968.05 
(46223.46) 
23.86% 2.53 
(1.26) 
24.69% 98.92% 4674 
2006 
58,321.57 
(45510.08) 
23.41% 
2.51 
(1.24) 
23.84% 98.98% 4372 
2007 
59,962.41 
(47080.58) 
24.16% 
2.46 
(1.22) 
22.79% 99.04% 3873 
2008 60,415.99 
(51830.51) 
23.10% 2.35 
(1.17) 
18.35% 96.19% 3634 
2009 61,139.59 
(52220.43) 
24.44% 2.37 
(1.18) 
18.97% 96.35% 3395 
2010 60,636.72 
(51875.42) 
25.98% 2.33 
(1.16) 
18.80% 96.10% 3099 
2011 
61,924.70 
(52771.07) 
26.97% 
2.35 
(1.15) 
18.56% 95.95% 2836 
 
1.4 Descriptive Results 
1.4.1 Changes in Product Offerings  
Using weekly retail sales data and product feature records from 2001 to 2011, we analyze 
supply-side changes in the market for margarine and spreads corresponding to implementation of 
the 2006 rule. Our analysis covers the entire product space and includes the total number of 
products (existing and new) offered each year. 
Table 1.2 shows an annual breakdown of the 895 total margarine and spreads offered at 
some time between 2001 and 2011 based on unique UPCs. On average, there were 332 different 
products on the market in every year, eleven of which carry TFF claims on their labels. We find 
that the share of TFF-labeled products reached its peak in 2007 at 6.5% of all available products. 
In comparison, only between 2.0% and 2.5% of margarine and spreads carried a TFF claim prior 
to 2006. The number of products with a TFF claim gradually decreased after 2007, with their 
13 
 
market share settling at around 3% of all available products—slightly above the level prior to the 
2006 rule change. 
 
Table 1.2 Summary Statistics of Number of Unique Margarine/Spread Products in the 
Market, 2001-2011 
 
Year 
No. of Products 
 
Margarine 
 
Spreads 
All TFF %TFF   Total TFF %TFF 
 
Total TFF %TFF 
2001 285 6 2.1% 
 
111 0 0.0%   174 6 3.4% 
2002 302 6 2.0% 
 
112 0 0.0% 
 
190 6 3.2% 
2003 304 7 2.3% 
 
122 1 0.8% 
 
182 6 3.3% 
2004 303 7 2.3% 
 
120 1 0.8% 
 
183 6 3.3% 
2005 280 7 2.5% 
 
111 1 0.9% 
 
169 6 3.6% 
2006 264 6 2.3% 
 
101 1 1.0% 
 
163 5 3.1% 
2007 356 23 6.5% 
 
115 4 3.5% 
 
241 19 7.9% 
2008 392 21 5.4% 
 
127 4 3.1% 
 
265 17 6.4% 
2009 399 17 4.3% 
 
124 3 2.4% 
 
275 14 5.1% 
2010 377 13 3.4% 
 
114 3 2.6% 
 
263 10 3.8% 
2011 386 12 3.1% 
 
111 2 1.8%   275 10 3.6% 
2001-
2011 
895 35 3.9%   287 7 2.4%   608 28 4.6% 
  Note: Products that re-enter the market after a period of absence are not counted again. 
 
Spreads dominate margarine in market share of products offered, capturing just over 60% 
of the market on average across the years. Furthermore, spreads experienced a more rapid 
increase in the number of products carrying TFF claims after implementation of the 2006 rule, 
from 3.1% in 2006 to 7.9% in 2007. In comparison, margarine products with TFF claims 
increased from 1.0% in 2006 to 3.5% in 2007. Both categories experienced a decrease in 
products with TFF claims after 2008 but the market shares of products offerings in both 
margarine and spreads stabilized at levels above those observed at the beginning of the decade. 
These trends demonstrate that firms reacted to the 2006 rule by increasing products with TFF 
claims.  
To further investigate the entry and exit of margarine and spreads across the sample 
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period, we separate products into those that entered the market and those that exited. 
Furthermore, we decompose these entries and exits by the existence of TFF labels. To identify if 
a product has 1) entered the market, 2) continued its previous existence, or 3) exited the market, 
we track the presence of its UPC over time. If a UPC not observed before year x appears in that 
year it is counted as a product entry in year x. If a UPC seen previously continues its presence in 
year x, it is counted as a product continuation. And if a UPC seen previously disappears in year x 
and afterwards, it is counted as a product exit. Table 1.3 displays the resulting product entry and 
exit by year. Because our panel starts in 2001, we do not observe product availability in 2000 or 
changes from 2000 to 2001. Thus, our findings start in 2002. 
Table 1.3 shows the total number of products available in the market each year, the 
number of products entering that year that do and do not carry a TFF claim, and the number of 
products that do or do not carry a TFF claim that exited. For instance, we observe a total of 302 
products available in the market in 2002, out of which 35 are newly entering products, none 
carrying a TFF label. Furthermore, 14 non TFF-labeled products available in 2001 exited the 
market and are no longer available by 2002. This implies a market expansion for products 
without TFF claims. Table 1.3 shows there is little market movement for products with TFF 
claims prior to the 2006 NLEA rule change. However, with the requirement that the Nutrition 
Facts Panel show trans fat content, more firms took the opportunity to introduce products with 
TFF claims in order to attract sales. The highest number of products introduced with TFF 
claims—seventeen—was in 2007, accounting for 58.6% of all new TFF-labeled products 
introduced in the entire eleven-year sample period. By 2009, the market once again saw 
relatively few introductions of TFF-labeled products, while a share of the TFF-labeled products 
continuously exited the market. This pattern suggests that the labeling policy had a significant 
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short-run effect on the use of TFF claims in the market for margarine and spreads but less of a 
long-run effect. Interestingly, table 1.3 also shows a significant uptick in entry and exit of 
products without TFF claims right after the NLEA rule change. However, as we discuss later, 
unlike for TFF-labeled products, prices of these products were not affected. 
Table 1.3 Entry and Exit of  Margarine and Spreads with TFF Claims, 2001-2011 
 
Year 
No. of Products 
in Market 
 Entry  Exit 
  TFF NonTFF   TFF NonTFF 
2002 302  0 35  0 14 
2003 304  1 29  0 23 
2004 303  0 28  0 31 
2005 280  0 17  0 39 
2006 264  0 11  1 29 
2007 356  17 174  0 90 
2008 392  9 191  11 162 
2009 399  0 42  4 33 
2010 377  2 26  6 47 
2011 386   0 37   1 33 
         Note: All products are accounted for, including those that re-enter the market after a period of 
absence4. 
 
Overall, many products with TFF claims were introduced shortly after the 2006 rule went into 
effect but exited the market some time later. Table 1.4 shows the product life of margarine and 
spreads introduced with TFF claims. More than 80% of TFF-labeled products lasted five years or 
less before exiting the market, with 25.7% being offered in the market for one year or less. On 
average, products remained in the market for close to 3.6 years. Table 1.5 shows changes over 
the sample period in the use of TFF claims on individual margarine and spreads products. 
Overall, sixteen products (45.7%) carried a TFF claim during all sample years in which they 
were offered. We would expect some of the products originally lacking a TFF claim (non-TFF 
labels) to have been reformulated or repackaged to carry a TFF claim after the 2006 rule. 
                                                 
4 Product introductions are recorded only when previously unobserved products come into the market. That is for a 
product to be considered a new entrant, it must not appear in any previous years. Similarly, we define product exits 
as complete discontinuations, i.e. only UPCs with no reoccurrences in any of following years are counted. As a 
result, changes in the total number of products in the market may differ from the net entry that would be calculated 
from the shown entry and exits. 
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Table 1.4 Product Life of Margarine and Spreads  
with TFF Claims Introduced from 2001-2011  
 
 Life Length 
in Years 
Number of 
Products 
Percentage of All 
Products 
1 9 25.7% 
2 6 17.1% 
3 3 8.6% 
4 6 17.1% 
5 5 14.3% 
6 0 0% 
7 3 8.6% 
8 2 5.7% 
9 1 2.9% 
 
Indeed, nine products (25.7%) were re-labeled from non-TFF to TFF labels during the sample 
period. However, ten products (28.6%) made the opposite shift resulting in products formerly 
labeled as TFF then being labeled non-TFF. Tables 4 and 5 suggest that the 2006 rule had a 
short-run effect of stimulating firms to use TFF claims on their product labels but that this effect 
faded over time. 
Table 1.5 TFF Labeling Changes to Margarine and Spreads, 2001-2011 
 Labeling Change Frequency Percentage 
Always TFF label 16 45.7% 
Switch from non-TFF label to TFF label 9 25.7% 
Switch from TFF-label to non-TFF label 6 17.1% 
Switch from non-TFF to TFF to non-TFF label 4 11.4% 
 
As the 2006 rule on trans fat took effect and the number of TFF-labeled products 
increased, we would expect to see changes not only in the competition between TFF-labeled and 
non-TFF-labeled products but also within TFF-labeled products. Intensified competition, 
especially between TFF-labeled products, may result in relative price changes across products. 
We use the price information in the data to explore possible price variations over time. First, we 
investigate relative price changes between products with and without TFF claims. We then 
extend our pricing analysis by further decomposing products by size and form. 
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Figure 1.1 shows the nominal monthly volume weighted average prices for products by 
claim and whether the product is branded. Because there are no private label products with TFF 
claims, the figure shows the price trends for branded products with TFF claims, branded products 
without TFF claims, and private label products without TFF claims. Over the period 2001 to 
2011, prices of margarine and spreads for non-TFF-labeled products were on an increasing trend, 
where the prices of branded products consistently exceeds that of private label products as 
expected. Figure 1.1 shows that while the average price for branded non-TFF-labeled products 
were on a steadily increasing trend, the average price for TFF-labeled products experienced a 
substantial drop approximately one year after the NLEA rule. As a result, the price differential 
between national brand TFF and non-TFF products disappeared from 2006 to 2007. In fact, the 
average prices for branded TFF-labeled products fell below those for branded non-TFF-labeled 
products. The convergence in prices lasted for close to three years; by the beginning of 2009, 
prices of branded TFF-labeled products once again became a bit higher than branded non-TFF-
labeled products. Over the next two years, prices evened out and by the end of 2011 the two 
types of products were offered at similar prices. 
This period of intense price competition is likely driven by the substantial introductions 
of TFF-labeled products over the same period. As reported in Table 1.3, 59% of all newly 
introduced products carrying TFF-label claims for the entire study period were introduced in 
2007 and 29% in 2008. As we discuss below, demand for TFF-labeled products substantially 
increased from 2007 to 2008, which would drive up prices for all TFF-labeled products holding 
supply constant. This implies that the drop in prices for TFF-labeled products is driven by 
heightened competition from the increase in TFF-labeled products. 
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Figure 1.1 Monthly Average Price of Margarine and Spreads – by Claim 
  
 
To investigate price movements in a more detailed manner, we further decompose 
products by their attributes. We first decompose all unique products by size in addition to the 
presence of TFF labels. There are many different sizes offered in the margarine and spreads 
market. We bin these products into five brackets. Figure 1.2 shows the nominal volume weighted 
average monthly price of margarine and spreads by the size of the package and by claim. Several 
patterns are clearly shown in this figure. First, there is clear evidence of nonlinear pricing across 
products of different sizes. Prices of smaller packages are much higher than those of larger 
packages. Second, products that carried TFF labels did not exist for most sizes until after the 
NLEA rule change. In fact, TFF labels only existed for products between 0.5 and 1 lb. Lastly, the 
price differentials between TFF and non-TFF-labeled products differ across sizes. For some 
sizes, prices of products carrying TFF labels are higher, while for other sizes prices are lower. 
For instance, prices of products with TFF labels are lower than their non-TFF counterparts for 
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the smallest, (0, 0.5] lb., sizes but prices with TFF labels are higher for the (0.75 1] lb. sizes. This 
suggests that price competition differs across different package sizes. 
Figure 1.2 Monthly Average Price of Margarine and Spreads – by Label and Size 
 
In a similar fashion, we also decompose all products by their forms. More specifically, 
margarine and spreads come in different forms, such as liquid and spread. Due to the large 
number of different types, we separate all unique products into solid and non-solid forms for 
clarity. Figures 1.3 and 1.4 present decompositions by solid form and non-solid forms 
respectively. 
Similar to the decomposition by size and label, figure 1.3 shows that the majority of solid 
forms did not carry TFF labels until the NLEA rule change. The only exception is spreads, where 
the price differential between TFF and non-TFF-labeled products follows the same pattern as 
those seen in figure 1.1. Prices of TFF-labeled spreads were above those without TFF labels 
prior to the NLEA rule change. As the number of TFF-labeled products increases and 
competition becomes fiercer, prices of these products experienced a drop and became lower than 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Ja
n
-0
1
M
ay
-0
1
S
ep
-0
1
Ja
n
-0
2
M
ay
-0
2
S
ep
-0
2
Ja
n
-0
3
M
ay
-0
3
S
ep
-0
3
Ja
n
-0
4
M
ay
-0
4
S
ep
-0
4
Ja
n
-0
5
M
ay
-0
5
S
ep
-0
5
Ja
n
-0
6
M
ay
-0
6
S
ep
-0
6
Ja
n
-0
7
M
ay
-0
7
S
ep
-0
7
Ja
n
-0
8
M
ay
-0
8
S
ep
-0
8
Ja
n
-0
9
M
ay
-0
9
S
ep
-0
9
Ja
n
-1
0
M
ay
-1
0
S
ep
-1
0
Ja
n
-1
1
M
ay
-1
1
S
ep
-1
1
nonTFF (0, 0.5] lb. nonTFF (0.5, 0.75] lb. nonTFF (0.75, 1] lb. nonTFF (1, 2] lb.
nonTFF (2, 30] lb. TFF (0, 0.5] lb. TFF (0.5, 0.75] lb. TFF (0.75, 1] lb.
TFF (1, 2] lb. TFF (2, 30] lb.
P
ri
ce
 p
er
 l
b
.
20 
 
those of products without TFF labels about one year after the rule change. For TFF-labeled 
products introduced after the rule change, prices remained fairly stable. For products in the stick 
form, prices of TFF-labeled products were consistently above those without TFF labels. And for 
products in the block form, prices of TFF-labeled products were consistently above those without 
TFF-labels. 
Figure 1.3 Monthly Average Price of Margarine and Spreads – by Label and Form, Solid 
 
Note: Products in the forms of patty, quarter, and solid do not carry TFF claims. 
 
Similar to figure 1.3, figure 1.4 shows the price trends for all products in non-solid forms, 
with products decomposed by whether they carry TFF labels, if such claims are available, and 
form. Out of the three forms, liquid and spray carried TFF-labeled products during some periods. 
However, there were no overlapping periods between these two types of products: Liquid 
products stopped carrying TFF labels right around the NLEA rule change, while spray products 
started carrying TFF labels two years after the rule change. That is to say, a consumer looking to 
purchase a non-solid TFF-labeled item would have been restricted to only one form. And as a 
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result, there was no direct competition between these two groups of products. In this setting, we 
see that while prices between TFF and non-TFF-labeled liquid products are fairly comparable, 
prices of TFF-labeled spray products are far below those without the claims. This suggests that 
price competition could differ significantly across forms. 
Figure 1.4 Monthly Average Price of Margarine and Spreads – by Label and Form, Non-
Solid 
 
Note: Products in the forms of squeeze do not carry TFF claims. 
 
In summary, the 2006 rule elicited a change on the supply side in the margarine and 
spreads market. Firms reacted to the new regulation by introducing many new products with 
voluntary TFF claims. In total, sixteen new TFF-labeled products were added to the market in 
2007 and eleven in 2008. Thus the labeling policy had a significant short-run effect on product 
offerings. As shown in table 1.2, the share of TFF-labeled spreads increased from 3.4% of 
product offerings in 2001 to 7.9% in 2007, shortly after implementation of the rule, while the 
share of margarine product offerings with such claims increased from 0.0% to 3.5% in the same 
period. However, many of these newly introduced products exited the market within five years. 
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In the long run, the market settled into an equilibrium with more TFF-labeled products than prior 
to the 2006 rule. By 2011, only 3.6% of spreads and 1.8% of margarine product offerings carried 
a TFF label. Not all TFF-labeled products remained consistently labeled, however; over 50% of 
products bearing TFF claims at some point in the sample period experienced changes in their 
labeling, either from or to a TFF-label (or in some cases, even changing back and forth). While a 
number of products were introduced after this labeling law change, the very vast majority of 
products did not carry voluntary claims even after the rule’s implementation. As a consequence, 
only a relatively small number and percentage of products were affected by the 2006 rule. Our 
results suggest that analysis concentrated on new product introductions in margarine and spreads 
in the short run after the policy change can easily overstate the effect of the 2006 rule on product 
offerings in the overall product category.  
1.4.2 Changes in Product Purchases 
The total effect of a labeling change is made up of the supply-side effects (mandatory 
labeling, changes in use of voluntary labeling, and changes in product offerings) explored in the 
previous section and consumer response to the labeling, which we explore in this section. Here 
we analyze how consumers reacted to the market changes brought about by the 2006 rule. 
Analyzing weekly household purchases of margarine and spreads in the same 2001-2011 period, 
we show that in general consumers increased consumption of products with TFF labels and 
decreased consumption of products without TFF labels.  
Table 1.6 shows summary statistics of annual purchases of margarine and spreads in 
millions of pounds of product purchased and millions of dollars in expenditures based on the 
retail panel data. Over the sample time period, expenditures on margarine and spreads did not 
change much except in 2008 and 2009 when it increased. In contrast, the volume purchased 
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dropped dramatically over the period from 74.7 million pounds in 2001 to 44.5 million pounds in 
2011. The proportion of purchases that were TFF-labeled products peaked in 2007, just after 
implementation of the 2006 rule, at nearly 6% of purchases measured both in pounds and dollars.  
Table 1.6 Annual Purchases of TFF-Labeled and Non-TFF-Labeled  
Margarine and Spreads, 2001-2011 
 
Year 
 
Volume 
 
Expenditure 
 
(in million lb.) 
 
(in millions of dollars) 
 
All TFF 
Percentage 
TFF  
All TFF 
Percentage 
TFF 
2001 
 
74.7 0.62 0.8% 
 
83.2 1.01 1.2% 
2002 
 
70.3 1.08 1.5% 
 
79.8 1.78 2.2% 
2003 
 
68.4 1.04 1.5% 
 
80.5 1.72 2.1% 
2004 
 
65.8 1.03 1.6% 
 
82.0 1.68 2.1% 
2005 
 
62.0 0.92 1.5% 
 
80.6 1.55 1.9% 
2006 
 
60.6 0.86 1.4% 
 
82.7 1.48 1.8% 
2007 
 
55.7 3.11 5.6% 
 
81.4 4.78 5.9% 
2008 
 
54.9 1.50 2.7% 
 
97.0 2.82 2.9% 
2009 
 
54.1 0.90 1.7% 
 
100.0 1.90 1.9% 
2010 
 
48.7 0.73 1.5% 
 
87.1 1.54 1.8% 
2011 
 
44.5 0.76 1.7% 
 
88.7 1.58 1.8% 
 
The volume of TFF-labeled products increased from 0.86 million pounds (1.4% of the 
market) in 2006 to 3.11 million pounds (5.6%) in 2007, then decreased sharply to 1.5 million 
pounds (2.7%) in 2008 before further declining to 0.9 million pounds (1.7%) in 2009. In 2010 
and 2011, the volume purchased of TFF-labeled products was 0.73 and 0.76 million pounds, 
respectively. Comparing starting and ending years, the volume of TFF-labeled product purchased 
increased slightly over the entire eleven-year period. TFF-labeled products comprised a growing 
share of the market purchase volume over the time period, starting at 0.8% in 2001, peaking at 
5.6% in 2007, and falling to 1.7% in 2011. This increase in shares largely comes from an ever 
shrinking base, from 74.1 million lbs. in 2001 to 44.5 million lbs. in 2011. We observe a similar 
trend for the market share of TFF-labeled products in dollar expenditures, which began at 1.2% 
of the market in 2001, peaked at 5.9%in 2007, and subsequently dropped to 1.8% in 2011.  
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Figure 1.5 Monthly U.S. Market Share of TFF-Labeled Margarine and Spreads, 2001-2011 
 
As shown in figure 1.5, the monthly purchase probability of TFF-labeled products using 
the retail panel increased dramatically from 1.25% in December of 2006 to 4.65% in January of 
2007 and increased further to 6.34% by late 2007, suggesting a significant short-run effect of the 
2006 rule. However, after August of 2008, the purchase probability fell back to a level only 
slightly higher than its previous average in the years 2001 to 2006. This pattern further supports 
previous studies of popular claims (Martinez 2013) that suggested that given the large choice sets 
of grocery products and limited consumer attention spans, strong effects of popular labels are 
typically short lived.  
We further check the robustness of this overall pattern using the alternative household 
panel data set. We find that for the average household, the percentage of margarine and spreads 
purchases comprised of TFF-labeled products was 0.74% in 2001. This percentage increased to 
5.8% in 2007, the period immediately after the labeling policy change, but by 2011 had dropped 
to 3.7%. The impact of the 2006 rule on the market was not sustained but rather stabilized at 
around 3% after 2007. Our household panel confirms the pattern found using the retail panel but 
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with less of a drop-off.  We emphasize the retail rather than the household panel results because 
the retail panel provides changes in the market at the nationwide level, which is a more 
comprehensive result. The short- and long-run effects are explored further in the regression 
analysis in the next section.  
To investigate how households across different demographic characteristics responded to 
the labeling policy change, we analyze consumers’ purchase behaviors for TFF-labeled products 
during the sample period using the household panel data. We concentrate on four demographic 
variables: income, family size, education of head of household, and presence of children. For 
each of the four demographic characteristics, we stratify households in the household panel into 
groups by income bracket, number of household members, education level, and age group of 
children in household. Trends in household purchases are shown in figures 1.6 to 1.9 for each of 
the four demographic characteristics. While different demographic groups reacted differently to 
the 2006 rule, one clear pattern emerges: households across all demographic groups increased 
their purchases of TFF-labeled products in 2007, as shown by the red reference line in each 
figure.  
Figure 1.6 plots annual average household purchases of TFF-labeled products as a 
percentage of all margarine and spreads product purchases over time by income level. 
Households in the household panel are divided into twelve income brackets by annual household 
income. The lowest income group is comprised of households earning $9,999 or below, and the 
highest of households earning $100,000 or above. As noted, households across all income 
brackets increased their purchases of TFF-labeled products in 2007. For instance, TFF-labeled 
products accounted for less than 1% of all margarine and spreads product purchases for the 
average household in the $20,000 to $24,999 income bracket, in marked contrast to nearly 8% in 
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2007, a trend consistent across all income brackets. Furthermore, households across nearly all 
income brackets, continued to purchase TFF-labeled products at an increased level after 2007. 
Again taking households in the $20,000 to $24,999 income bracket as an example, their 
purchases of TFF-labeled products decreased shortly after 2007 but remained at levels above 
those in 2001, settling into equilibrium around 4% at the end of 2011. The same trend holds for 
all other income brackets except for the top one ($100,000 and above), where TFF-product 
purchases at 3% exceeded those of other income brackets prior to 2007, rose, and then returned 
to that level by 2009.  
Figure 1.6 Annual Purchase Percentage of TFF-Labeled Margarine and Spreads by 
Household Income Bracket 
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While income may play a role in household behavior, it is also likely that education 
levels, which are correlated with income levels, affect how households obtain and more 
importantly use nutrition and health information in making their purchase decisions. Figure 1.7 
shows similar annual average household purchases of TFF-labeled products as in figure 1.6 with 
the households grouped according to the education level of the head of household.5 Figure 1.7 
shows that while households across all education levels increased purchases of TFF-labeled 
products in reaction to the 2006 rule, households with lower education levels reacted much more 
strongly. For instance, households from the lowest education level, “some grade school,” 
increased their purchases from an average of 0% in 2001-2006 to 10% in 2007. In comparison, 
households from the highest education level, “post-graduate work,” showed much less variation 
over time.  
While we do not have a measure of health motivation at the household level, our results 
provide some support for the finding of Balasubramanian & Cole (2002) that highly motivated 
and less knowledgeable people successfully transitioned into using the  Nutrition Facts Panel and 
potentially benefited more from the NLEA than their counterparts. In contrast, Kiesel, 
McClusky, & Villas-Boas (2011) and Shimshack, Ward, & Beatty (2007) find contradicting 
results that more educated households rely on the Nutrition Facts Panel and respond as intended 
by the NLEA whereas less educated households do not. Our results suggest that households with 
less education respond more than their counterparts to front of the package TFF claims made 
after the 2006 NLEA rule change.  
We find that both low income and less educated households purchased low levels of TFF 
products but transitioned into high levels of TFF-labeled products post 2006, suggesting that they 
were more strongly affected by the 2006 NLEA rule change. This is in contrast to both high 
                                                 
5 If female household education level is not available, we used male head of household education level instead. 
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income and more educated households, whose purchases of TFF-labeled products stayed 
relatively constant over the sample period. While the correlation between these two groups 
necessitates that they show similar trends, the duration and magnitude of the NLEA effects 
differs over all. As the regression analyses that follow show, education level does not predict 
statistically significant changes in a household’s behavior post the NLEA rule change. However, 
household income is a statistically significant predictor of households’ purchase probability of 
TFF-labeled products.  
We further investigate how household composition, namely the number of household 
members and the presence of children, influenced household reaction to the 2006 rule. Figure 1.8 
shows the percentage of TFF-labeled products over time by the number of household members, 
where household members range from one to “six or more.” Prior to 2006, purchases of TFF-
labeled products varied little by household size. However, shortly after the 2006 rule went into 
effect, households with fewer members (one, two, or three) continued to purchase products with 
TFF claims at a substantially higher level than before. In comparison, households of larger sizes 
(four, five, or “six or more”) did not substantially change their purchase habits in the longer run. 
For instance, households with six or more members increased their purchases of TFF-labeled 
products by only about 1%.  
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Figure 1.7 Annual Purchase Percentage of TFF-Labeled Margarine and Spreads by 
Education of Head of Household 
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Figure 1.8 Annual Purchase Percentage of TFF-Labeled Margarine and Spreads by 
Household Size   
          
 
 
It is possible that the presence of children may influence changes in household purchase 
behavior. Figure 1.9 plots the share of TFF-labeled product purchases over time for households 
with children across different age groups and for households with no children present. In the 
short run, the 2006 rule affected all households with and without children but had the largest 
impact on those with children in age groups 0-5 and 12-17. Overall, the short-run effect on 
households without children was marginally smaller than on each of the groups of households 
with children. In the long run, the annual average purchase of TFF-labeled products for each 
group of households with children varied more widely than those for the group of households 
with no children.  
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Figure 1.9 Annual Purchase Percentage of TFF-Labeled Margarine and Spreads by 
Presence of Children 
 
1.5 Regression Model 
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regression analysis. Our primary interest lies in understanding how consumers reacted to this rule 
change in the short run and in the long run. We identify these effects by analyzing changes in 
consumers’ purchase probability of products with TFF labels in and around 2006, when the 
NLEA rule changed.  
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children. Product attributes, in addition to the presence of a TFF claim, are captured by several 
indicator variables including brand, size of the product, what form the product comes in, whether 
the product has zero calories, and whether the product contains vegetable oil. Because we do not 
directly observe the Nutrition Facts Panel, these variables help control for additional factors that 
may influence consumer preferences. Table 1.7 defines all variables used in the analysis. 
Prices in the household utility function are normalized to dollars per oz, which controls 
for the presence of nonlinear pricing across products of differing sizes. We model time in two 
different ways. First, we explicitly estimate short- and long-run effects. We exploit a natural 
structural break in the monthly market share of TFF-labeled products, as shown in figure 1.5, to 
distinguish between the short run and the long run, defining short run (SR) as an indicator 
variable that takes the value 1 in 2006-2007 and 0 otherwise and long run (LR) as an indicator 
variable that takes the value 1 in 2008-2011 and 0 otherwise. Second, we model time using a 
series of quarterly dummies beginning in the first quarter of 2006 and ending in the fourth 
quarter of 2011. Variation in household purchases in each quarter between 2006 and 2011 are 
compared to the average of household purchases from 2001 to 2005. In this way, we are able to 
flexibly capture the effect of the 2006 rule on the market for TFF-labeled margarine and spreads 
over time.  
We include as controls the set of household demographic variables shown in the previous 
section. These include household income, education level, household size, and presence of 
children. As discussed previously, some of the demographic variables are likely correlated. For 
instance, household income is likely correlated to education level and household size is likely 
correlated to the presence of children. However, since these characteristics each provide an 
interesting aspect of the household and are not perfectly correlated, which avoids collinearity 
33 
 
problems in the regressions, we include all as controls in our analysis. We conduct robustness 
checks using each demographic characteristic separately, which are documented in the 
Appendix. Our results are not affected. In addition, we control for a large set of product 
attributes including brand, product size, form, whether the product has zero calories, and whether 
the product contains vegetable oil. Because we do not directly observe the Nutrition Facts Panel 
or the amount of calories per serving, these product attributes help control for product specific 
effects.  
We model households’ choice of purchasing TFF-labeled products using the standard 
discrete choice framework, where household utility is specified under six variations. Each variant 
represents a unique combination of time effects and controls, which will be discussed in detail 
below. The NLEA rule change does not directly affect a household’s utility. Rather, households’ 
utility for the presence of TFF labels is measured by the time variables. If households value 
products with TFF labels shortly after the NLEA rule change, their utility of purchasing TFF-
labeled products increases in the short run and the probability of them purchasing these products 
increases. Likewise, if they value products with TFF labels long after the NLEA rule change, 
their utility of purchasing TFF-labeled products increases in the long run. Comparing 
households’ purchase probabilities of TFF-labeled products across the different time periods – 
before the 2006 rule change, shortly after, and long after – allows us to identify the effect of the 
2006 NLEA rule.  
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Table 1.7 Variables Included in Regression Analysis 
 
 
In the first and second utility specifications, we model the short- and long-run effects of 
the 2006 rule using the variables SR and LR as defined in table 1.7. The two models differ in 
product attribute controls used. In the first, we control only for zero calories and vegetable oil. In 
 
Symbol Variable Description 
P Price per oz. Price per oz. 
T Year Year running from 2001 to 2011 
SR Short-Run Dummy with value of 1 in 2006 and 2007 
LR Long-Run Dummy with value of 1 in years from 2008 to 2011 
Q Quarter Dummy 
Dummy variables indicating quarters beginning in the 1st quarter of 2006 and 
ending in the 4th quarter of 2011 
X 
Low Income Dummy with value of 1 if the household makes less than $9,999 annually  
High Income Dummy with value of one if the household makes more than $100,000 annually  
Education Categorical variable with value codes: 
                                                             1 = Some grade school or less 
                                                             2 = Completed grade school  
                                                             3 = Some high school       
                                                             4 = Graduated high school 
                                                             5 = Technical school      
                                                             6 = Some college       
                                                             7 = Graduated from college 
                                                             8 = Post graduate work   
Household Size Categorical variable with value codes: 
 
                                                            1 = One person           
 
                                                            2 = Two people            
 
                                                            3 = Three people         
 
                                                            4 = Four people         
 
                                                            5 = Five people        
 
                                                   6 = Six or more people 
Presence of Children Dummy with value of 1 if the household has at least one child  
   
Z 
Zero Calorie Dummy with value of 1 if the product has no calories  
Vegetable Oil Dummy with value of 1 if the product contains vegetable oil 
Brand Dummies for each brand 
Size Dummies for each size bracket, as shown in figure 1.2 
Form Dummies for each form the product takes, as shown in figures 1.3 and 1.4. 
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the second model, we control for all product attributes discussed earlier. Mathematically, 
household i’s utility for product j in period t, Uijt, is expressed as the linear function below:  
ijtjtittttijtijt ZXLRSRTPU  +++++++=    (1) 
where Pijt denotes the price of product j household i faces in week t; T denotes the year of week t 
and captures any aggregate time trend; SRt denotes the weeks starting January 2006 and ending 
December 2007 and captures the effect of the 2006 rule on consumer demand of TFF-labeled 
products in the short run; LRt denotes weeks starting January 2008 and ending December 2011 
and captures the long-run effects of the 2006 rule. Household demographic variables defined 
above are captured in Xit, and product attributes are captured in Zjt. Following standard notation, 
the household-product-time-specific error term ijt  captures any remaining idiosyncratic 
components in the utility and allows us to estimate the model under a discrete choice framework.   
In the third and fourth specifications, the models keep the same utility specifications as 
above but add the interactions between SR and household demographics and between LR and 
household demographics. This captures more precisely how households with different 
demographics reacted to the 2006 rule in both the short and the long run. The difference between 
the two models again is in the product attribute controls. Household i’s utility function is 
expressed as:   
ijtittittjtittttijtijt XLRXSRZXLRSRTPU  +++++++++= 2121      (2) 
In the fifth and sixth specifications, the models estimate the effect of the 2006 rule on 
consumer purchases by using a set of quarter dummies instead of the time trend and short- and 
long-run dummies. Models 5 and 6, as defined below, capture the effect of the 2006 rule 
nonparametrically over time and represent the most flexible specifications. 
ijtjtittijtijt ZXQPU  +++++=          (3) 
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We estimate parameters of the household utility function using a binary response 
framework. The outcome variable Yijt takes the value of 1 if product j that household i purchased 
in period t carries a TFF label, and 0 otherwise. That is,  





=
0   if0
0   if1
ijt
ijt
ijt U
U
Y  
We assume the idiosyncratic error term  follows a Type I Extreme Value distribution 
which implies a standard Logit framework. That is, the probability of observing a TFF-labeled 
product purchase in each of the three models is: 
( )
( )
( )jtittttijt
jtittttijt
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1.6 Regression Results 
Marginal effects implied by the parameter estimates of the models are reported in table 
1.8. Overall, we find that implementation of the 2006 rule is associated with increased purchases 
of TFF-labeled products. This result is robust across all specifications. However, the impact of 
this labeling rule decreased over time, with short-run effects significantly stronger than those in 
the long run. 
ijt
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Table 1.8 Factors Affecting Purchase Probability for Margarine/Spreads with Trans Fat Free Claims,  
Logit Model. 2001-2011 
 
 Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
Variable dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx 
Price per oz. 0.0017*** 
 
0.0008* 
 
0.0017*** 
 
0.0008* 
 
0.0019*** 
 
0.0009* 
SR 0.0111*** 
 
0.0133*** 
 
0.0147* 
 
0.0145* 
 
 
 
 
LR 0.0027 
 
0.0067* 
 
0.0210* 
 
0.0240* 
 
 
 
 
Low Income -0.0071*** 
 
-0.0059*** 
 
-0.0073*** 
 
-0.0059** 
 
-0.0069*** 
 
-0.0058*** 
Low Income*SR 
 
   
0.0101 
 
0.0100 
 
 
 
 
Low Income*LR 
 
   
-0.0023 
 
-0.0024 
 
 
 
 
High Income -0.0016 
 
-0.0025 
 
0.0108 
 
0.0059 
 
-0.0017 
 
-0.0025 
High Income*SR 
 
   
-0.0087** 
 
-0.0074** 
 
 
 
 
High Income*LR 
 
   
-0.0118*** 
 
-0.0097*** 
 
 
 
 
Education 0.0001 
 
-0.0002 
 
0.0008 
 
0.0004 
 
0.0002 
 
-0.0002 
Education*SR 
 
   
-0.0005 
 
-0.0002 
 
 
 
 
Education*LR 
 
   
-0.0016 
 
-0.0015 
 
 
 
 
Family Size -0.0005 
 
-0.00003 
 
0.0005 
 
0.0007 
 
-0.0005 
 
0.00001 
Family Size*SR 
 
   
-0.0001 
 
-0.000009 
 
 
 
 
Family Size*LR 
 
   
-0.0024 
 
-0.0018 
 
 
 
 
Child -0.0001 
 
0.0011 
 
-0.0034 
 
-0.0012 
 
-0.00001 
 
0.00110 
Child*SR 
 
   
0.0050 
 
0.0029 
 
 
 
 
Child*LR 
 
   
0.0069 
 
0.0048 
 
 
 
 
Year 0.0027*** 
 
0.0023*** 
 
0.0027*** 
 
0.0023*** 
 
 
 
 
1st Quarter 2006 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0062** 
 
0.0086*** 
2nd Quarter 2006 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0061** 
 
0.0076*** 
3rd Quarter 2006 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0046* 
 
0.0056** 
4th Quarter 2006 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0020 
 
0.0022 
1st Quarter 2007 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0425*** 
 
0.0497*** 
2nd Quarter 2007 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0477*** 
 
0.0569*** 
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3rd Quarter 2007 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0690*** 
 
0.0698*** 
4th Quarter 2007 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0836*** 
 
0.0882*** 
1st Quarter 2008 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0489*** 
 
0.0615*** 
2nd Quarter 2008 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0598*** 
 
0.0763*** 
3rd Quarter 2008 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0337*** 
 
0.0391*** 
4th Quarter 2008 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0289*** 
 
0.0389*** 
1st Quarter 2009 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0268*** 
 
0.0367*** 
2nd Quarter 2009 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0312*** 
 
0.0413*** 
3rd Quarter 2009 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0276*** 
 
0.0335*** 
4th Quarter 2009 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0229*** 
 
0.0267*** 
1st Quarter 2010 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0250*** 
 
0.0339*** 
2nd Quarter 2010 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0440*** 
 
0.0484*** 
3rd Quarter 2010 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0473*** 
 
0.0526*** 
4th Quarter 2010 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0395*** 
 
0.0394*** 
1st Quarter 2011 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0332*** 
 
0.0376*** 
2nd Quarter 2011 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0374*** 
 
0.0385*** 
3rd Quarter 2011 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0297*** 
 
0.0324*** 
4th Quarter 2011 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0233*** 
 
0.0266*** 
Zero calorie -0.0084*** 
 
0.0171* 
 
-0.0083*** 
 
0.0166 
 
-0.0085*** 
 
0.0154 
Vegetable oil -0.0022 
 
-0.0033 
 
-0.0022 
 
-0.0034 
 
-0.0020 
 
-0.0034 
Size fixed effect 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
 
✓ 
Brand fixed effect 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
 
✓ 
Form fixed effect     ✓       ✓       ✓ 
PrTFF 0.0184 
 
0.0165 
 
0.0182 
 
0.0163 
 
0.0181 
 
0.0162 
Wald Chi2 586.68 
 
1141.22 
 
614.96 
 
1193.6 
 
1098.16 
 
2072.44 
Prob > Chi2 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
Sample Size 452035   283191   452035   283191   452035   283191 
*Statistically different from zero at the 10% level of significance.  
**Statistically different from zero at the 5% level of significance.  
***Statistically different from zero at the 1% level of significance. 
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Under model 1, the marginal effect of price (0.0017) indicates that, ceteris paribus, 
households are not very sensitive to price. In the margarine and spreads market, a one-dollar 
price increase leads to nearly no change (0.17% rise) in weekly purchases of TFF-labeled 
products. The marginal effect for the time trend, T, is estimated to be 0.0027 and is statistically 
significant at 1%. This implies that over time consumers would have gradually increased their 
purchases of TFF-labeled products by 0.27% per year, even in the absence of labeling changes 
resulting from the 2006 rule. However, the label changes that accompanied the 2006 rule 
increased this probability of purchase significantly. The marginal short- and long-run effects of 
the 2006 rule are estimated at 0.0111 and 0.0027 respectively, implying that after the 2006 rule 
took effect, households were likely to increase purchases of TFF-labeled margarine and spreads 
by an additional 1.11% in the short run. This effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
long run effect is not statistically significant in this model. 
For the set of demographic controls, only household income plays a statistically 
significant role in influencing the purchase probability of products with TFF claims in this 
model. Even then, only low income households reacted substantially differently from other 
households. Compared to middle-income households, the purchase probability of TFF-labeled 
products is 0.71% lower for low-income households. For the set of product attribute controls, 
only zero calories shows statistically significant results. Products with zero calories decrease the 
likelihood of a TFF-labeled purchase by 0.84%. Containing vegetable oils does not influence 
purchase probabilities of products with TFF claims. 
Compared to model 1, our main results – on the short and long run effects of the NLEA 
rule change – remain qualitatively the same as in model 2. The only difference is that the long 
run effect is now statistically significant at the 10% level and it suggests that even long after the 
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2006 NLEA rule change consumers still increased their purchases of TFF-labeled products. Most 
of the other variables experienced only minor changes in magnitudes. This is not surprising since 
the addition of more product attribute controls leads to a smaller sample size due to the 
collinearity between some attributes and the dependent variable. For instance, some brands only 
carry products with TFF labels.   
The marginal effects of price and the time trend in models 3 and 4 follow the same 
direction and magnitude as those in models 1 and 2. The marginal short- and long-run effects of 
the 2006 rule, on the other hand, both increased in magnitude and are both statistically 
significant at the 10% level. Holding all else constant, the rule increased household likelihood of 
purchasing TFF-labeled products by about 1.5% in the short run and around 2% in the long run. 
These increases in magnitude, in comparison to the first two models, are counter-balanced by 
mostly negative interaction terms with household demographic variables. For instance, the 
marginal effect of the interaction between LR and high income is -0.0118, which indicates that 
households in the highest income bracket experience a lower likelihood of TFF-labeled 
purchases by 1.18% compared to middle-income households. Demographic and product attribute 
control variables share similar results as those for models 1 and 2.  
Models 5 and 6 present a more flexible way of capturing the effect of NLEA over time. 
The models do not predefine a distinction between the short-run period and the long-run period. 
Instead we use a series of quarterly dummies to capture the changing purchase behaviors of 
households over time after implementation of the 2006 rule. We keep the demographic and 
product variables as those in models 1 and 2. As shown in the last two columns of table 1.8, the 
marginal effects of price, demographic characteristics, and product attributes are nearly identical 
to those of the previous models. This shows the robustness of these effects.  
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The quarterly dummies from the first quarter of 2006 to the last quarter of 2011 show the 
quarterly changes in consumer purchases of TFF-labeled products. For instance, we see that 
households increased their purchases of these products by a slight margin of 0.62% in model 5 
and 0.86% in model 6 immediately following the implementation of the 2006 rule. After one 
year, in the first quarter of 2007, households sharply increased their TFF-labeled purchases. 
Taking model 5 as an example, compared with the same quarter in 2006, households increased 
their purchases of TFF-labeled products by 3.63% (4.25% − 0.62%). This trend continued for the 
rest of the year. By the end of 2007, purchase probability of TFF-labeled products with TFF 
claims increased another 4.11% (8.36% − 4.25%). Household TFF-labeled purchases began to 
decline in the following year. By the last quarter of 2008, purchase probabilities of TFF-labeled 
products had decreased to 2.89%, 5.47% below the same quarter in 2007 but still 2.27% above 
the first quarter in 2006. Purchases of TFF-labeled products fluctuated between 2.29% and 
4.73% in subsequent quarters. By the end of our sample period, in the last quarter of 2011, 
purchases of TFF-labeled products remained at 2.33%, still substantially above the first quarter 
of 2006 when the 2006 rule was implemented. Results from model 6 show similar trends.  
Our results illustrate that the 2006 rule requiring the inclusion of trans fat quantities on 
federally-mandated Nutrition Facts Panels elicited a positive and strong response from 
households in purchasing TFF-labeled margarine and spreads in the short run. At the peak of this 
response, consumers in the household panel increased their purchases of products with TFF 
claims by over 8% within two years of the rule’s implementation. Only the demographic variable 
low income showed a statistically significant effect on purchases, with consumers in this group 
increasing their purchases to a lesser degree than middle income consumers. Analysis of the 
impact of the policy change over time, using two different specifications, shows that the 
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consumer response lessened over time with purchases of products with TFF claims stabilizing at 
a level around 2% of the market, which is above the level in the period prior to the labeling rule 
taking effect.   
1.7 Conclusions 
Changes in nutrition labeling policy are targeted at improving information disclosure. As 
an example of such a change, the FDA’s 2006 rule requiring a separate listing for trans fats on 
the mandatory Nutrition Facts Panel gave consumers the opportunity to quickly search for the 
amount of trans fat in a given product at the point of sale. In theory, increased consumer 
awareness due to a policy change such as this would result in changes on both the supply and 
demand sides of the market. On the supply side, the policy change could lead to increases in 
competition and possibly result, for example in the case studied here, in firms introducing more 
trans-fat-free products and voluntarily placing more voluntary “trans-fat-free” claims on package 
labels. On the demand side, the policy change could result in increased purchases by consumers 
of products with lower levels of trans fats, for example in the case studied here, in increased 
purchases of TFF labeled products.  
Using comprehensive panel data that spans five years before and six years after the 
FDA’s implementation of its rule in 2006, we find both supply- and demand-side responses in 
the market for margarine and spreads following closely on the heels of the rule’s 
implementation. Our findings indicate that firms, in addition to including the line-item trans fat 
quantity as required on Nutrition Facts Panels, also introduced many new TFF margarine and 
spreads products with voluntary TFF labels. At the same time, consumers increased their 
purchases of these TFF-labeled products. In the following years, however, a number of TFF-
labeled products exited the market. This decline mirrored consumer behavior: fewer households 
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continued their purchases of TFF-labeled margarine and spreads, although responses to the 
changing market differed across demographic groups. Both supply-side and demand-side effects 
were stronger in the short run than the long run. In the long run, the market settled into a new 
equilibrium with only somewhat more TFF-labeled margarine and spreads product offerings than 
prior to the 2006 rule, and only slightly more consumer purchases of those products than before 
the policy change. 
Earlier studies of the effects of new labeling regulations have largely focused on supply-
side changes in product offerings due to new product introductions. While important, this focus 
yields an incomplete picture of the effects of new labeling regulations because it addresses only a 
portion, sometimes small, of all products offered for sale and purchased in a given food category. 
Our results give a much fuller picture by looking at changes in an entire product category—
margarine and spreads—over an eleven-year period straddling the policy change. This before-
and-after picture brings together product offerings (supply side) and consumer purchasing 
(demand side). This approach shows that, for the margarine and spreads market, despite robust 
introduction of new TFF-labeled products and corresponding increases in consumer purchases of 
these products following implementation of the 2006 rule, TFF-labeled products still made up a 
relatively small share of the overall market, in offerings and in purchases, and these shares fell 
from their peak in the time period further out from the policy change.  
The impact of the FDA trans fat labeling policy change for other product categories, and 
of other nutrition labeling policy changes for all product categories, may be quite different from 
that found here for margarine and spreads after the implementation of mandatory trans fat 
labeling on the Nutrition Facts Panel. A comprehensive understanding of the impacts of nutrition 
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labeling policy changes requires a comprehensive analysis of both supply and demand side 
changes across product categories and over time.   
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1.8 Regression Robustness Checks 
Table 1.9 below documents regression results using only household income and family 
size as demographic controls. Results for the main parameters of interest are qualitatively similar 
to those reported in table 1.8.  
 
Table 1.9 Factors Affecting Purchase Probability for Margarine/Spreads with Trans Fat 
Free Claims, Logit Model. 2001-2011 
 
 Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
Variable dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx 
Price per oz. 0.0017*** 
 
0.0008* 
 
0.0017*** 
 
0.0008* 
 
0.0019*** 
 
0.0008* 
SR 0.0111*** 
 
0.0133*** 
 
0.0086** 
 
0.0117** 
 
 
 
 
LR 0.0025 
 
0.0069** 
 
0.0080 
 
0.0124** 
 
 
 
 
Low Income -0.0071*** 
 
-0.0058*** 
 
-0.0079*** 
 
-0.0062** 
 
-0.0070*** 
 
-0.0057*** 
Low Income*SR 
 
   
0.0114 
 
0.0104 
 
 
 
 
Low Income*LR 
 
   
-0.0012 
 
-0.0021 
 
 
 
 
High Income -0.0015 
 
-0.0027 
 
0.0125 
 
0.0065 
 
-0.0015 
 
-0.0026 
High Income*SR 
 
   
-0.0091* 
 
-0.0075** 
 
 
 
 
High Income*LR 
 
   
-0.0125*** 
 
-0.0103*** 
 
 
 
 
Family Size -0.0005 
 
0.0002 
 
-0.0003 
 
0.0005 
 
-0.0005 
 
0.0002 
Family Size*SR 
 
   
0.0009 
 
0.0006 
 
 
 
 
Family Size*LR 
 
   
-0.0013 
 
-0.0012 
 
 
 
 
Year 0.0027*** 
 
0.0023*** 
 
0.0027*** 
 
0.0023*** 
 
 
 
 
1st Quarter 2006 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0062** 
 
0.0086*** 
2nd Quarter 2006 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0061** 
 
0.0076*** 
3rd Quarter 2006 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0046* 
 
0.0056** 
4th Quarter 2006 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0020 
 
0.0022 
1st Quarter 2007 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0426*** 
 
0.0497*** 
2nd Quarter 2007 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0478*** 
 
0.0569*** 
3rd Quarter 2007 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0690*** 
 
0.0698*** 
4th Quarter 2007 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0837*** 
 
0.0883*** 
1st Quarter 2008 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0482*** 
 
0.0622*** 
2nd Quarter 2008 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0590*** 
 
0.0771*** 
3rd Quarter 2008 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0331*** 
 
0.0395*** 
4th Quarter 2008 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0284*** 
 
0.0394*** 
1st Quarter 2009 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0263*** 
 
0.0372*** 
2nd Quarter 2009 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0307*** 
 
0.0419*** 
3rd Quarter 2009 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0271*** 
 
0.0340*** 
4th Quarter 2009 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0225*** 
 
0.0271*** 
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1st Quarter 2010 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0246*** 
 
0.0343*** 
2nd Quarter 2010 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0434*** 
 
0.0490*** 
3rd Quarter 2010 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0466*** 
 
0.0532*** 
4th Quarter 2010 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0389*** 
 
0.0399*** 
1st Quarter 2011 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0327*** 
 
0.0383*** 
2nd Quarter 2011 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0368*** 
 
0.0390*** 
3rd Quarter 2011 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0292*** 
 
0.0329*** 
4th Quarter 2011 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0228*** 
 
0.0270*** 
Zero calorie -0.0084*** 
 
0.0172* 
 
-0.0084*** 
 
0.0171* 
 
-0.0085*** 
 
0.0155* 
Vegetable oil -0.0022 
 
-0.0032 
 
-0.0022 
 
-0.0033 
 
-0.0020 
 
-0.0033 
Size fixed effect 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
 
✓ 
Brand fixed effect 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
 
✓ 
Form fixed effect     ✓        ✓       ✓ 
PrTFF 0.0184 
 
0.0165 
 
0.0182 
 
0.0164 
 
0.0181 
 
0.0162 
Wald Chi2 579.72 
 
1132.56 
 
599.19 
 
1156.41 
 
1055.96 
 
2040.79 
Prob > Chi2 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
Sample Size 452035   283191   452035   283191   452035   283191 
*Statistically different from zero at the 10% level of significance.  
**Statistically different from zero at the 5% level of significance.  
***Statistically different from zero at the 1% level of significance. 
 
Table 1.10 below documents regression results using only education and presence of 
children as demographic controls. Results for the main parameters of interest are qualitatively 
similar to those reported in table 1.8.  
 
Table 1.10 Factors Affecting Purchase Probability for Margarine/Spreads with Trans Fat 
Free Claims, Logit Model. 2001-2011 
 
 Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
Variable dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx 
Price per oz. 0.0017*** 
 
0.0008* 
 
0.0017*** 
 
0.0008* 
 
0.0019*** 
 
0.0008* 
SR 0.0112*** 
 
0.0134*** 
 
0.0196** 
 
0.0192** 
 
 
 
 
LR 0.0024 
 
0.0064* 
 
0.0180* 
 
0.0217** 
 
 
 
 
Education 0.0002 
 
-0.0002 
 
0.0014** 
 
0.0008 
 
0.0002 
 
-0.0002 
Education*SR 
 
   
-0.0012 
 
-0.0008 
 
 
 
 
Education*LR 
 
   
-0.0027** 
 
-0.0023** 
 
 
 
 
Child -0.0010 
 
0.0011 
 
-0.0021 
 
0.0004 
 
-0.0009 
 
0.0012 
Child*SR 
 
   
0.0041 
 
0.0022 
 
 
 
 
Child*LR 
 
   
0.0008 
 
0.0003 
 
 
 
 
Year 0.0028*** 
 
0.0024*** 
 
0.0027*** 
 
0.0023*** 
 
 
 
 
 47 
 
1st Quarter 2006 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0063** 
 
0.0087*** 
2nd Quarter 2006 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0062** 
 
0.0076*** 
3rd Quarter 2006 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0047* 
 
0.0057** 
4th Quarter 2006 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0020 
 
0.0022 
1st Quarter 2007 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0429*** 
 
0.0502*** 
2nd Quarter 2007 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0482*** 
 
0.0575*** 
3rd Quarter 2007 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0695*** 
 
0.0704*** 
4th Quarter 2007 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0843*** 
 
0.0889*** 
1st Quarter 2008 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0487*** 
 
0.0607*** 
2nd Quarter 2008 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0593*** 
 
0.0752*** 
3rd Quarter 2008 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0333*** 
 
0.0384*** 
4th Quarter 2008 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0287*** 
 
0.0383*** 
1st Quarter 2009 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0265*** 
 
0.0362*** 
2nd Quarter 2009 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0309*** 
 
0.0407*** 
3rd Quarter 2009 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0272*** 
 
0.0330*** 
4th Quarter 2009 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0226*** 
 
0.0262*** 
1st Quarter 2010 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0247*** 
 
0.0335*** 
2nd Quarter 2010 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0436*** 
 
0.0479*** 
3rd Quarter 2010 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0467*** 
 
0.0520*** 
4th Quarter 2010 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0390*** 
 
0.0387*** 
1st Quarter 2011 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0328*** 
 
0.0372*** 
2nd Quarter 2011 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0369*** 
 
0.0379*** 
3rd Quarter 2011 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0295*** 
 
0.0320*** 
4th Quarter 2011 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0229*** 
 
0.0262*** 
Zero calorie -0.0084*** 
 
0.0167 
 
-0.0083*** 
 
0.0162 
 
-0.0085*** 
 
0.0149 
Vegetable oil -0.0022 
 
-0.0034 
 
-0.0022 
 
-0.0034 
 
-0.0020 
 
-0.0035 
Size fixed effect 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
 
✓ 
Brand fixed effect 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
 
✓ 
Form fixed effect     ✓       ✓       ✓ 
PrTFF 0.0185 
 
0.0165 
 
0.0184 
 
0.0165 
 
0.0181 
 
0.0163 
Wald Chi2 577.19 
 
1114.92 
 
577.88 
 
1126.26 
 
1057.96 
 
2057.05 
Prob > Chi2 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
Sample Size 452035   283191   452035   283191   452035   283191 
*Statistically different from zero at the 10% level of significance.  
**Statistically different from zero at the 5% level of significance.  
***Statistically different from zero at the 1% level of significance. 
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Table 1.11 below documents baseline regression results with no demographic controls. 
Results for the main parameters of interest remain qualitatively similar to those reported in table 
1.8.  
 
Table 1.11 Factors Affecting Purchase Probability for Margarine/Spreads with Trans Fat 
Free Claims, Logit Model. 2001-2011 
 
 Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
Variable dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx   dy/dx 
Price per oz. 0.0017*** 
 
0.0008* 
 
0.0017*** 
 
0.0008* 
 
0.0019*** 
 
0.0008* 
SR 0.0111*** 
 
0.0133*** 
 
0.0119*** 
 
0.0140*** 
 
 
 
 
LR 0.0025 
 
0.0069* 
 
0.0043 
 
0.0085** 
 
 
 
 
Low Income -0.0069*** 
 
-0.0059*** 
 
-0.0078*** 
 
-0.0064*** 
 
-0.0068*** 
 
-0.0058*** 
Low Income*SR 
 
   
0.0102 
 
0.0097 
 
 
 
 
Low Income*LR 
 
   
-0.0006 
 
-0.0014 
 
 
 
 
High Income -0.0018 
 
-0.0026 
 
0.0122 
 
0.0065 
 
-0.0018 
 
-0.0025 
High Income*SR 
 
   
-0.0088** 
 
-0.0073** 
 
 
 
 
High Income*LR 
 
   
-0.0129*** 
 
-0.0106*** 
 
 
 
 
Year 0.0027*** 
 
0.0023*** 
 
0.0027*** 
 
0.0023*** 
 
 
 
 
1st Quarter 2006 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0062** 
 
0.0086*** 
2nd Quarter 2006 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0061** 
 
0.0076*** 
3rd Quarter 2006 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0046* 
 
0.0056** 
4th Quarter 2006 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0020 
 
0.0022 
1st Quarter 2007 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0426*** 
 
0.0497*** 
2nd Quarter 2007 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0479*** 
 
0.0569*** 
3rd Quarter 2007 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0691*** 
 
0.0698*** 
4th Quarter 2007 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0838*** 
 
0.0882*** 
1st Quarter 2008 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0484*** 
 
0.0621*** 
2nd Quarter 2008 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0592*** 
 
0.0770*** 
3rd Quarter 2008 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0333*** 
 
0.0394*** 
4th Quarter 2008 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0286*** 
 
0.0393*** 
1st Quarter 2009 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0264*** 
 
0.0371*** 
2nd Quarter 2009 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0309*** 
 
0.0417*** 
3rd Quarter 2009 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0273*** 
 
0.0339*** 
4th Quarter 2009 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0226*** 
 
0.0270*** 
1st Quarter 2010 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0247*** 
 
0.0343*** 
2nd Quarter 2010 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0436*** 
 
0.0489*** 
3rd Quarter 2010 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0469*** 
 
0.0531*** 
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4th Quarter 2010 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0391*** 
 
0.0397*** 
1st Quarter 2011 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0328*** 
 
0.0382*** 
2nd Quarter 2011 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0370*** 
 
0.0389*** 
3rd Quarter 2011 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0294*** 
 
0.0328*** 
4th Quarter 2011 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0230*** 
 
0.0269*** 
Zero calorie -0.0084*** 
 
0.0173* 
 
-0.0084*** 
 
0.0176* 
 
-0.0085*** 
 
0.0155* 
Vegetable oil -0.0022 
 
-0.0032 
 
-0.0022 
 
-0.0032 
 
-0.0020 
 
-0.0033 
Size fixed effect 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
 
✓ 
Brand fixed effect 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
 
✓ 
Form fixed effect     ✓       ✓       ✓ 
PrTFF 0.0184 
 
0.0165 
 
0.0182 
 
0.0164 
 
0.0181 
 
0.0162 
Wald Chi2 579.87 
 
1129.29 
 
586.62 
 
1139.49 
 
1051.84 
 
2040.14 
Prob > Chi2 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
Sample Size 452035   283191   452035   283191   452035   283191 
*Statistically different from zero at the 10% level of significance.  
**Statistically different from zero at the 5% level of significance.  
***Statistically different from zero at the 1% level of significance. 
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CHAPTER 2  
ESTIMATING CONSUMERS’ WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR TRANS FAT IN THE 
POST MANDATORY LABELING REGIME 
2.1 Introduction 
Coronary heart disease is currently the leading cause of death in the United States, 
responsible for one in three deaths (Go et al. 2014); obesity—with an estimated prevalence of 
35% in the U.S. adult population over the 2011–2012 period—imposes annual nationwide 
medical costs of $315.8 billion (2010 values) (Cawley et al. 2015). In this environment, both 
federal and state governments have introduced various policies to try to stem and reduce the 
prevalence and incidence of obesity, heart disease, and various co-morbidities. Trans fats—tied 
to increases in coronary heart disease, obesity, and insulin sensitivity (Go et al. 2014)—are one 
of the nutrients targeted for policy interventions in the United States. In particular, legislation 
enacted in 2003 required the explicit trans fat labeling for all foods beginning in 2006. In 2015, 
the Obama administration finalized a ban on trans fats, providing a 3-year compliance period to 
allow the food industry to remove all trans fats from their products.  
Using Nielsen retail scanner data on microwavable popcorn purchases over the 9 years 
(January 2006–December 2014) following the introduction of the trans fat labeling requirement, 
this chapter explores consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for trans fat. We model products as a 
bundle of characteristics (Lancaster 1966) that includes normalized trans fat content per 100 g 
and other nutrient content. We use a multinomial logit model to estimate product-level demand, 
which allows us to estimate how a change in trans fat content affects consumer demand for 
microwavable popcorn products. We allow consumer preferences to vary over time while 
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holding price sensitivity constant. Furthermore, we decompose retail sales data at the state level 
and explore whether there are regional differences in consumer preferences.  
2.2 Literature Review 
Trans fats, or (industrially produced) trans fatty acids, are formed when hydrogen is 
added to a vegetable oil through the process of partial hydrogenation to make a more solid and 
stable cooking fat. Trans fats are commonly used to extend food products’ shelf lives and cost-
efficiently modify their taste and texture. The 2006 labeling legislation led some producers to 
abandon the use of trans fats, but they are still commonly found in products such as cookies, 
cakes, margarines, baking mixes, fried foods, and snack items, particularly microwavable 
popcorn.  
Trans fat consumption is linked to higher levels of “bad” LDL (low-density lipoprotein) 
cholesterol and is associated with a 23% increase in the risk of coronary heart disease (Go et al. 
2014), a significant increase in adiposity (Go et al. 2014), abdominal obesity, and changes in 
insulin sensitivity (Kavanagh et al. 2007). Trans fat have no known health or nutritional benefits 
(Ascherio and Willet 1997), and most health experts recommend limiting trans fat consumption 
to a minimum. Many countries have therefore implemented trans fat reduction policies, ranging 
from nutrient labeling to complete bans on their use in food production. For example, since 2004, 
trans fats cannot make up more than 2% of total fat content in any food item in Denmark 
(Stender et al. 2006), leading to a drastic decline in trans fat consumption in that country. 
Producers have widely varying levels of trans fat in their products depending on local consumer 
preferences and legislation, and the same types of food can have very different levels of trans fat. 
In 2006 in Sweden and Norway, which had no bans on trans fats at that time, trans fats made up 
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48% and 49%, respectively, of total fat in popcorn. By contrast, the trans fat content of popcorn 
from Denmark (after the trans fat legislation) was below 5% (Stender et al. 2006).  
Previous literature suggests that consumer preferences for the taste of trans fat are 
unclear. Consumer acceptance of reformulated products’ taste and texture could also vary 
substantially across products (Eckel et al. 2007). Some have argued that trans fat bans represent 
unjustified limitations to consumer choice (Resnik 2010), which was somewhat validated by 
some consumers “mourning” their favorite foods ahead of the trans fat ban (Greatist 2015). 
According to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA, 2015), the 2006 trans fat labeling 
policy gave consumers information necessary to make heart-healthy choices, implicitly 
suggesting that consumers not only know the health effects of trans fats but also prefer to limit 
their consumption for health reasons. This assumption implies that most consumers believe trans 
fat to be a negative characteristic.  
However, consumers might actually prefer items with trans fat content, either due to a 
lack of knowledge about their health effects or due to preferences for reduced saturated fat 
content in general (trans fats are a frequent substitute for saturated fats). Estimates of nutrient-
specific elasticity in the current literature are often quite inelastic (Huang and Lin 2000, Allais et 
al. 2010), while studies examining consumer preferences for fat in particular suggest that fat 
content is often seen as a positive characteristic. Ou (2017) finds that, on average, consumers 
were willing to pay $0.002/oz more for the taste of trans fat based on a structural discrete choice 
model using data from 2 years before to 2 years after the 2006 labeling policy was instituted. 
Rapp et al. (2009) suggest that both consumers with heart disease and healthy consumers prefer 
full-fat foods over low-fat foods; using a taste experiment, Vickers and Mullan (1997) find that 
participants consume more cheese when the full-fat variety is available and rate full-fat cheeses 
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as tastier and more likable. While trans fats are just one type of fat, and high-fat products do not 
necessarily contain trans fats, it is possible that some consumers might actually seek out trans fat 
products for their flavor characteristics, particularly when trans fat content is also associated with 
high fat content.  
However, Ou (2017) also finds evidence that a consumer with average demographic 
characteristics is willing to pay −$0.013/oz. for the trans fat content label, which is significantly 
larger in magnitude than WTP for trans fat taste. This means that consumers are willing to pay 
more to compensate for a loss in utility from health than for a utility gain from the taste of trans 
fats. WTP to pay for the label is noticeably higher among those with higher incomes, those with 
more education, more frequent buyers, and smokers. Many other studies suggest that fat can be 
perceived as a negative characteristic: Results from Lusk and Parker’s (2009) choice experiment 
suggest that consumers would prefer reduced saturated fat content in ground beef; similarly, 
Krause et al. (2007) conclude that consumers perceive saturated fat content as an undesirable 
characteristic in butter.  
Overall, some evidence indicates that companies started voluntarily limiting trans fat 
content in their products after the 2006 labeling regulation came into force. Unnevehr and 
Jagmanaite (2008) suggest that the restaurant and food service industry in particular started 
reformulating their products to limit trans fat content. Doell et al. (2012) look at trans fat 
consumption in the U.S. population using the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey 
and suggest that overall trans fat consumption decreased from 4.6 g per person per day in 2003 to 
1.3 g per person per day in 2013, although individuals with certain dietary habits (e.g., those who 
frequently consume certain brands or types of food products with at least 1 g trans fat per 
serving, such as refrigerated biscuits, ready-to-use frozen pizzas, and microwavable popcorn) 
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may still consume high levels of trans fat. Most trans fat labeling policies have led to some 
reductions in consumption, but their relative effectiveness varies considerably, with bans being 
the most effective policy option for reducing trans fat consumption.  
In the United States, the 2006 trans fat labeling rule is estimated to have led to an 
approximately 58% reduction of trans fatty acids levels in blood plasma and reduced blood levels 
of LDL cholesterol, but the World Health Organization suggests that continued reductions in 
trans fat consumption are still required (Down et al. 2013). In particular, in the absence of 
national and local bans, some population sub-groups continue to consume higher-than-advisable 
levels of trans fats, either due to particular tastes or to the relative costliness of trans fat–free 
products (Down et al. 2013). Additionally, some trans fat labeling might be perceived as 
deceptive: Trans fats with less than 0.5 g per serving do not need to be labeled, but product labels 
often underestimate the size of actual consumer servings (FDA 2015).  
2.3 Data Description  
We choose microwavable popcorn as our product category because it can be produced 
with or without trans fats. According to the U.S. Popcorn Board (2018), Americans consume 
approximately 13 billion quarts of popped popcorn annually, 70% of which is eaten at home. 
Most (90%) home-prepared popcorn is purchased in un-popped form, including the 
microwavable popcorn we focus on here. In 1999, microwavable popcorn accounted for around 
72% of all popcorn sales in the United States (Hansen and Brester 2012). As a snack item, 
popcorn is often considered to be a healthier alternative, endorsed by Weight Watchers as a 
weight-conscious snack and the American Dental Association as a sugar-free snack; the 
American Cancer Society recognizes popcorn for its high fiber content (Hansen and Brester 
2012).  
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We first summarize large-scale Nielsen retail scanner datasets—consisting of weekly 
purchase and pricing data from more than 90 participating retail chains—from the Kilts Center 
for Marketing. We focus on six popcorn brands with 104 unique products, each defined by a 
unique combination of brand and flavor. Together, Orville Redenbacher's, Pop Secret, Act II, 
Jolly Time, and Cousin Willie's account for over 96% of market share; all other brands, 
including private-label brands, serve as the outside good. Table 2.1 presents the average and 
yearly market share for 2006–2014, the period of our analysis. 
Table 2.1 Yearly and Average Market Shares by Brand, 2006–2014 
 
 
Orville Redenbacher’s and Pop Secret are the clear market leaders, with the former brand enjoying a 
higher initial market share and the latter catching up consistently, securing a slightly higher market 
share by 2014. This increase in Pop Secret’s market share seems to have occurred mostly at the 
expense of Act II (which lost slightly over 50% of its 2006 market share by 2014) and smaller 
brands, whose overall share declined from almost 6% in 2006 to just over 1% in 2014. Figure 2.1 
provides detailed information on monthly shares by brand. The turning point for the change to the 
original market share distribution appears to be 2009, before which market shares remained 
relatively stable. Table 2.2 shows that 4 out of 5 microwave popcorn brands carry products with 
trans fats. Altogether, 15 products have trans fats, with a total market share of more than 30% out of 
all products. Pop Secret has the largest market share for products with trans fats, approximately 
27.5%. 
 
Table 1. Yearly and average market shares per brand, 2006-2014      
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average 
Orville Redenbacher's 39.52% 40.76% 42.34% 42.39% 39.92% 42.33% 41.30% 40.43% 39.36% 40.93%
Pop Secret 21.96% 22.22% 23.77% 25.93% 32.17% 33.78% 34.69% 36.85% 39.82% 30.13%
Act II 24.61% 23.43% 21.74% 19.84% 16.92% 14.91% 13.97% 13.00% 12.14% 17.84%
Jolly Time 6.37% 5.91% 4.54% 5.72% 5.58% 5.42% 5.72% 5.98% 5.62% 5.65%
Cousin Willie's 1.76% 1.56% 1.35% 1.56% 1.82% 1.71% 2.25% 2.04% 1.90% 1.77%
All Other 5.78% 6.11% 6.26% 4.55% 3.59% 1.84% 2.07% 1.70% 1.16% 3.67%
All market shares calculated using monthly (?) Nielsen retail data 
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Figure 2.1 Volume Market Share by Top Brands, 2006 to 2014 
 
Table 2.2 Number and Market Share of Products with Trans Fat by Brand 
 
Company Brand 
Number of products   Volume market share 
Trans fat Total   Trans fat Total 
Conagra Foods, Inc Orville Redenbacher's 1 25 
 
0.48% 38.43% 
Diamond Foods, Inc Pop Secret 4 12 
 
27.53% 27.98% 
Conagra Foods, Inc Act II 0 19 
 
0.00% 17.60% 
American Pop Corn Company Jolly Time 3 12 
 
2.46% 5.58% 
Ramsey Popcorn Co. Cousin Willie's 7 9 
 
1.28% 1.75% 
Total   15 77   31.75% 91.34% 
Note: These five brands have 104 products altogether. But 27 products are not included, because they are either non-
microwavable popcorn or no nutrition information available. Private label products only exist in household panel 
data, but not in retail store date. 
 
0
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Cousin Willie's
Jolly TimeOrville Redenbacher's
Pop Secret
Graph 1. Volume market share by top brands, 2006-2010
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Table 2.3 summaries the level of each nutrition ingredient contained in all 77 sample products. It 
shows that the maximum amount of trans fat per 100 g of microwave popcorn is 15.2 g and the 
average is 2.0 g, with a standard deviation of 4.3 g. 
Table 2.3 Summary Statistics of Nutrition Ingredients 
 
Variable Unit n Mean S.D. Min 25th Mdn 75th Max 
Calories 
 
77 464.4 71.2 152.2 424.2 472.2 514.3 642.9 
Total fat g 77 27.7 10.0 3.0 21.1 30.0 35.7 42.9 
Saturated fat g 77 9.0 4.6 0.0 6.3 8.3 11.8 20.6 
Trans fat g 77 2.0 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.2 
Sodium mg 77 803.1 347.0 0.0 531.3 852.9 1000.0 1896.6 
Total carbohydrate g 77 53.2 10.3 11.4 46.9 52.8 60.0 70.3 
Dietary fiber g 77 9.6 3.7 0.0 8.1 8.8 10.0 18.2 
Sugars g 77 1.7 6.0 0.0 5.9 6.7 9.7 37.8 
Protein g 77 7.3 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.1 
*Serving size normalized to 100 g. 
As significant changes in market-share distribution occurred across the observed period, 
we would prefer to see whether any brand adjusted its advertising strategy, which could explain 
the observed changes. Figure 2.2 provides monthly advertising expenditures for the top brands.  
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Figure 2.2 Monthly Advertising Expenditures by Brand (in $1,000) 2010–2014 
 
Orville Redenbacher’s and Jolly Time spent the most on advertising on average, with Pop 
Secret maintaining relatively low expenditures most of the observed period. This advertising 
snapshot suggests that advertising changes do not seem to be behind the observed changes in 
market shares across the top brands in our sample. We only have access to advertising 
expenditures data starting in 2010, which limits our ability to consistently control for the effects 
of advertising in our main model estimation. Given that advertising does not seem to drive 
observed market share changes, we omit this factor from our main analysis. 
2.4 Descriptive Results 
Nutrition information—including serving size, calories, total fat, saturated fat, trans fat, 
cholesterol, sodium, dietary fiber, sugars, and protein—was collected manually from the top 5 
brands’ websites for 77 of 104 popcorn products. These 77 products accounted for 91.3% of 
market share in volume of sales across 49 U.S. states and over a 9-year period (2006–2014). 
0
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Graph 2. Monthly advertising expenditures by top brands (in 1,000$??) , 2010-2014
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Figure 2.3 categorizes all 77 products by trans fat content and butter flavor. We present 
the monthly volume market shares and monthly volume weighted average prices for each of the 
four types of microwavable popcorn over our sample period using all retail store sales from the 
Nielsen scanner data. In January 2006, over 60% of microwavable popcorn sold in markets was 
butter flavored and trans fat free. A little more than 20% of products were butter flavored and 
had trans fat. However, butter-flavored, trans fat–free products gradually lost market share to 
butter-flavored products with trans fat. By the end of 2014, the market share for butter-flavored 
microwavable popcorn with trans fat was larger than that of butter-flavored products without 
trans fat by nearly 20%. Non-butter microwavable popcorn products experienced a modest 
decrease in volume market share for products without trans fat from 2006 to 2014. Over time, 
monthly volume market shares for non-butter products with trans fat stayed relatively 
unchanged. Interestingly, butter-flavored products (both with and without trans fat) were priced 
lower than their non-butter counterparts for the entirety of our sample period. The average price 
of non-butter products with trans fat was higher until around late 2008, and mostly lower 
afterward, than that of non-butter products without trans fat. For butter-flavored products, having 
trans fat would initially increase prices by approximately $0.4/g, but since late 2009, prices for 
both butter-flavored products with and without trans fat remained similar. This implies that 
consumers were price sensitive and less likely to purchase butter-flavored products with trans fat 
when they were priced higher than their non–trans fat counterparts. Nevertheless, when given the 
same price, they would actually prefer butter-flavored products with trans fat to butter-flavored 
products without trans fat, even though there were only 7 butter-flavored products with trans fat 
compared to 28 without across the sample period. Non-butter products without trans fat sold 
better than those with trans fat at all times, which might result from the fact that there were only 
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8 non-butter products with trans fat, compared to 34 without. Another potential explanation 
could be that consumers think products with trans fat taste better when they choose butter-
flavored microwavable popcorn, which are already “bad” in the sense that they contain high 
levels of saturated fat. However, non-butter microwavable popcorn is considered to be a 
relatively healthier choice, so less trans fat would be preferred.   
Figure 2.3 Microwavable Popcorn Volume Market Shares and Volume Weighted 
 
 
2.4.1 Summary Statistics by Category 
We then examine the four microwavable popcorn markets by comparing monthly volume 
market shares and volume weighted average monthly prices of the top five brands. Figure 2.4 
(will be reformatted later) shows that Orville Redenbacher’s dominated the markets for both 
butter and non-butter products without trans fat, while Pop Secret was the top brand in markets 
for both butter and non-butter products with trans fat. Note that Act II did not have any products 
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with trans fat and only Orville Redenbacher’s non-butter products had trans fat.6 
Counterintuitively, the dominant brand (Pop Secret) in the trans fat microwavable popcorn 
market, both with butter and without butter, was sold at the highest price at all times. Jolly 
Time’s market share for butter microwavable popcorn with trans fat decreased slightly, while its 
market share for butter microwavable popcorn without trans fat had a compensating slight 
increase. Jolly Time’s market share in the market of non-butter microwavable popcorn with trans 
fat dropped dramatically from more than 2% to nearly 0, but its market share for non-butter 
microwavable popcorn without trans fat stayed relatively similar over time. This seems to imply 
that Jolly Time made efforts to promote its products without trans fat and had some success in 
increasing sales of butter microwavable popcorn without trans fat but did not make any 
breakthrough in the market for non-butter products without trans fat. We expect that the 2015 
trans fat ban will greatly affect Cousin Willie’s and Pop Secret, both of which had a much larger 
market share in the trans fat products markets than in the non–trans fat markets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Market shares of Orville Redenbacher’s and Act II in both non–trans fat microwavable popcorn markets mirrored 
one another nearly perfectly. Since the same manufacturer owns both brands, it is possible that the firm strategically 
promotes one brand at a time. 
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Figure 2.4 Monthly Volume Market Shares and Volume Weighted Average Monthly Prices 
by Brand 
 
2.4.2 Summary Statistics by State 
In Figure 2.5, we further decompose and explore consumer preference for trans fat by region, as 
defined by United States Census Bureau.7 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Figure cited from https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf 
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Figure 2.5 Census Regions and Divisions of the United States 
 
 
Table 2.4 summarizes the average number of microwavable popcorn products available 
annually in four regional areas.8 For example, on average, 6 out of 30 microwavable popcorn 
products offered in one northeastern state contained trans fats in 2008. Between 2006 and 2014, 
the Northeast and West had fewer products available with trans fat than did the Midwest or the 
South; this is also true for products with trans fat as a percentage of all products. This implies 
that consumers in the Northeast and West were generally exposed to fewer microwavable 
popcorn products with trans fat.  
                                                 
8 We assume that there was no change in the nutritional contents of the products. Unfortunately, no available 
database allows us to observe the nutrition panels for all 77 products over time. Product reformulations were 
possible after the 2006 trans fat labeling rule, but we were able to confirm limited, if any, changes in the nutrition 
panel information for all 77 products using their historical websites. 
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While the number of total products available regardless of region, experienced a slight 
decrease in 2009 and 2010, the number of products with trans fats remained roughly the same for 
all four regions. Due to the global 2008 financial crisis (when people were tight on budget and 
less willing to spend money on snacks), it is possible that manufacturers temporarily cut down 
the availability of some of their products, only a few of which had trans fat, suggesting that firms 
consider products with trans fat to be potentially more profitable than other products. Consumers 
did not show a strong preference for avoiding products with trans fat, even after the 2006 
mandatory trans fat labeling rule.     
Table 2.4 Average Number of Microwavable Popcorn Products with Trans Fat 
 
Year 
Northeast 
 
Midwest 
 
West 
 
South 
# All # TF % TF   # All # TF % TF   # All # TF % TF   # All # TF % TF 
2006 34 7 20.6 
 
38 9 23.7 
 
37 8 21.6 
 
40 10 25.0 
2007 34 6 17.6 
 
39 9 23.1 
 
37 8 21.6 
 
39 10 25.6 
2008 30 6 20.0 
 
38 9 23.7 
 
36 8 22.2 
 
36 10 27.8 
2009 27 5 18.5 
 
35 9 25.7 
 
31 8 25.8 
 
32 9 28.1 
2010 26 6 23.1 
 
34 9 26.5 
 
30 8 26.7 
 
30 8 26.7 
2011 30 6 20.0 
 
35 9 25.7 
 
33 7 21.2 
 
35 9 25.7 
2012 29 6 20.7 
 
33 10 30.3 
 
31 7 22.6 
 
35 10 28.6 
2013 31 6 19.4 
 
37 10 27.0 
 
36 8 22.2 
 
38 11 28.9 
2014 29 5 17.2   36 9 25.0   36 8 22.2   37 10 27.0 
 
Table 2.5 shows the annual average number of microwavable popcorn products with 
trans fat available in 49 states across all sample years. We observe variation in the number of 
Products with trans fat in the Midwest and the South than in the Northeast and West. While the 
Northeast states averaged 6 products with trans fat and Western states averaged almost 7 
products with trans fat, the average number of products with trans fat in the Midwest and 
Southern states varied between 6 and 12. Again, we notice that, on average, fewer microwavable 
popcorn products and fewer products with trans fat were available in stores in the Northeast and 
West than in the Midwest and the South. Similarly, the number of products with trans fat as a 
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percentage of all available products was also lower in the Northeast and West than in the 
Midwest and the South. Annual average percentages of products with trans fat all differed in four  
Table 2.5 Average Number of Microwavable Popcorn with Trans Fat by State 
  
Region State # All # TF % TF   Region State # All # TF % TF 
Northeast 
CT 29 6 20.7 
 
Midwest 
IA 35 8 22.9 
MA 29 6 20.7 
 
IL 44 12 27.3 
ME 27 5 18.5 
 
IN 41 12 29.3 
NH 28 5 17.9 
 
KS 31 8 25.8 
NJ 33 6 18.2 
 
MI 37 12 32.4 
NY 33 6 18.2 
 
MN 35 7 20.0 
PA 36 7 19.4 
 
MO 40 12 30.0 
RI 27 6 22.2 
 
ND 34 7 20.6 
VT 26 5 19.2 
 
NE 35 8 22.9 
Average 30 6 20.0 
 
OH 40 12 30.0 
          
 
SD 32 7 21.9 
South 
AL 34 10 29.4 
 
WI 31 7 22.6 
AR 40 12 30.0 
 
Average 36 9 25.0 
DC 28 6 21.4 
 
          
DE 32 6 18.8 
 
West 
AZ 32 7 21.9 
FL 29 6 20.7 
 
CA 37 7 18.9 
GA 41 12 29.3 
 
CO 34 7 20.6 
KY 38 12 31.6 
 
ID 35 8 22.9 
LA 34 9 26.5 
 
MT 32 8 25.0 
MD 34 6 17.6 
 
NM 32 8 25.0 
MS 38 12 31.6 
 
NV 36 8 22.2 
NC 38 10 26.3 
 
OR 34 7 20.6 
OK 28 7 25.0 
 
UT 35 8 22.9 
SC 36 10 27.8 
 
WA 34 7 20.6 
TN 41 12 29.3 
 
WY 34 8 23.5 
TX 40 11 27.5 
 
Average 34 7 20.6 
VA 42 12 28.6 
      
WV 38 11 28.9 
      
Average 36 10 27.8             
 
regions, depending on the total number of products. Michigan had the highest annual average 
percentage (32.4%) of microwavable popcorn with trans fat, and Maryland had the lowest 
(17.6%). Mississippi, Kentucky, and Arkansas in South and Ohio and Missouri in the Midwest 
all had high annual average percentages (≥30%) of products with trans fat. In comparison, many 
Northeastern states—including New York, New Jersey, and New Hampshire—and one Western 
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state—California—had low annual average percentages (<20%) of products with trans fat on the 
market. 
We also decompose monthly sales by volume of each type of microwavable popcorn by 
state.9 Table 2.6 shows that butter-flavored microwavable popcorn products without trans fat had 
the highest average monthly sales, followed by butter-flavored products with trans fat, which 
together made up over 80% of average sales by volume each month in all states. Similarly, non-
butter microwavable popcorn without trans fat had larger average monthly sales than non-butter 
products with trans fat in all 49 states (by as little as 7.1% in Kentucky and as high as 965.1% in 
Maine). More specifically, Western states had the highest average sales of butter-flavored 
products with trans fat (2,374,200 oz.) and the highest average sales of non-butter products with 
trans fat (345,500 oz.), whereas Midwestern states had the lowest average sales of butter-
flavored products with trans fat (3,536,600 oz.) and Northeastern states had the lowest average 
sales of non-butter products with trans fat (110,500 oz.). Generally, we observe considerable 
variation in average monthly sales within each region as well as across regions due to 
demographics such as population For instance, given similar product offerings, Connecticut had 
smaller average monthly sales of all four types of microwavable popcorn than neighboring 
Massachusetts, as Massachusetts has twice as many residents. Among all states, average monthly 
sales by volume of butter-flavored products with trans fat was the largest in California (more 
than 18 million oz.) sales by volume and smallest in Oklahoma (167,100 oz.). California also had 
the largest average monthly sales by volume of non-butter products with trans fat (1,719,400 oz.) 
                                                 
9 While we decompose the volume-weighted average prices by product types and states, we see very limited 
variation in volume-weighted average monthly unit prices both within regions and across regions. With very few 
exceptions, we find butter-flavored products both with and without trans fat, on average, were priced lower than 
their non-butter counterparts. In general, though some states had higher average monthly prices for products with 
trans fat, and vice versa, the average monthly prices for butter-flavored products with and without trans fat were 
very similar; the same was true for the average monthly prices for non-butter products with and without trans fat. 
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and Oklahoma the smallest sales by volume (9,600 oz.). Consequently, we control for time and 
state differences in our regression analysis.  
Table 2.6 Average Monthly Microwavable Popcorn Sales by Volume (1,000 Oz.) by 
Category and State 
 
region State 
No trans fat  
& no butter 
  
Trans fat  
but no butter 
  
Butter but  
no trans fat 
  
Trans fat  
& butter 
Northeast 
CT 313.5 
 
74.6 
 
2,411.9 
 
1,435.9 
MA 1,060.7 
 
81.9 
 
7,632.1 
 
3,569.4 
ME 374.9 
 
35.2 
 
2,099.0 
 
1,224.3 
NH 518.2 
 
38.9 
 
3,161.5 
 
1,743.0 
NJ 669.1 
 
179.9 
 
5,731.5 
 
3,465.5 
NY 1,469.3 
 
252.3 
 
11,968.9 
 
6,185.2 
PA 1,611.8 
 
301.7 
 
9,048.9 
 
8,080.9 
RI 83.1 
 
12.4 
 
780.3 
 
306.3 
VT 136.4 
 
17.4 
 
641.0 
 
445.0 
Average 693.0 
 
110.5 
 
4,830.6 
 
2,939.5 
         
Midwest 
IA 713.7 
 
238.8 
 
3,770.8 
 
1,977.8 
IL 2,059.2 
 
397.5 
 
11,524.8 
 
5,409.9 
IN 822.8 
 
478.0 
 
4,570.0 
 
2,223.7 
KS 473.9 
 
71.9 
 
2,287.2 
 
987.8 
MI 913.2 
 
255.9 
 
5,399.8 
 
2,281.0 
MN 1,394.8 
 
120.2 
 
5,984.4 
 
3,188.1 
MO 504.5 
 
124.5 
 
2,450.2 
 
1,008.3 
ND 108.9 
 
14.2 
 
506.6 
 
255.8 
NE 351.9 
 
76.3 
 
1,676.0 
 
825.9 
OH 1,946.5 
 
827.7 
 
10,272.5 
 
7,194.7 
SD 142.4 
 
35.3 
 
669.6 
 
397.4 
WI 894.1 
 
74.8 
 
4,208.3 
 
2,739.7 
Average 860.5 
 
226.3 
 
4,443.3 
 
2,374.2 
         
West 
AZ 1,424.8 
 
389.6 
 
6,715.9 
 
4,366.8 
CA 8,138.2 
 
1,719.4 
 
30,566.8 
 
18,810.0 
CO 1,399.5 
 
446.8 
 
6,616.3 
 
3,670.9 
ID 233.9 
 
80.2 
 
933.2 
 
691.3 
MT 175.3 
 
58.8 
 
819.3 
 
576.9 
NM 163.4 
 
41.4 
 
1,009.7 
 
502.2 
NV 485.8 
 
130.8 
 
2,572.2 
 
1,505.1 
OR 1,104.8 
 
259.2 
 
3,909.2 
 
2,465.8 
UT 370.0 
 
142.5 
 
1,569.8 
 
1,035.5 
WA 1,894.4 
 
487.2 
 
7,746.7 
 
4,898.0 
WY 113.0 
 
44.9 
 
581.9 
 
379.6 
Average 1,409.4 
 
345.5 
 
5,731.0 
 
3,536.6 
         
South 
AL 329.4 
 
43.1 
 
1,610.3 
 
1,051.1 
AR 279.4 
 
125.5 
 
1,405.9 
 
588.6 
DC 118.8 
 
30.2 
 
391.5 
 
341.6 
DE 165.7 
 
44.2 
 
1,385.4 
 
948.2 
FL 1,754.9 
 
151.9 
 
10,472.8 
 
5,686.4 
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GA 1,478.1 
 
348.2 
 
7,658.8 
 
4,205.0 
KY 723.7 
 
675.8 
 
3,928.1 
 
2,479.0 
LA 476.8 
 
95.2 
 
2,478.7 
 
1,099.7 
MD 1,363.6 
 
321.0 
 
6,607.4 
 
5,092.1 
MS 243.4 
 
102.1 
 
1,214.5 
 
500.1 
NC 3,057.9 
 
444.1 
 
14,405.0 
 
10,591.6 
OK 114.5 
 
9.6 
 
564.1 
 
167.1 
SC 1,018.8 
 
119.8 
 
4,861.2 
 
3,449.3 
TN 1,349.5 
 
677.9 
 
6,967.8 
 
3,403.5 
TX 2,831.0 
 
586.5 
 
13,402.0 
 
6,174.3 
VA 2,515.9 
 
499.1 
 
11,749.7 
 
7,958.9 
WV 289.6 
 
67.4 
 
1,502.6 
 
740.8 
Average 1,065.3   255.4   5,329.7   3,204.5 
 
2.5 Regression Model 
To identify consumers’ preferences for trans fat, we assume that we observe N markets, 
defined by the unique combination of week and state. In each market, n, there are J alternative 
microwavable popcorn products and one aggregated outside option, j=0. The level of utility from 
each choice in each market is denoted as Unj. We do not directly observe this utility, but we 
know amount of trans fat (in grams) contained in each product, TFj, and some other product 
attributes, xj, including brand, flavor, and nutrient content. Additionally, yeari and regionk are 
indicator variables for year and region fixed effects, respectively. The coefficients of interest are 
δ0, the coefficient on the level of trans fat in Southern states in 2006; δi, the coefficients on the 
interaction between TFj and a year dummy (i = 2007, …, 2014); δk, the coefficients on the 
interaction between TFj and a region dummy (k = Northeast, Midwest, and West); and δi,k, the 
coefficients on the interaction between TFj, a year dummy, and a region dummy. These 
coefficients plot the progression of demand for products with trans fat over time and by region 
relative to products without trans fat. The utility is assumed to be a linear function of these 
observed factors and the unobserved idiosyncratic shock 𝜖𝑛𝑗 : 
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𝑈𝑛𝑗
= 𝛼𝑝𝑛𝑗 + 𝛿0 𝑇𝐹𝑗 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝑗
𝑖
 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘 ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝑗
𝑘
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑖,𝑘𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘 ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝑗
𝑖,𝑘
+ 𝛽𝑥𝑗 + 𝛾𝑑𝑛𝑗 + 𝜖𝑛𝑗  
𝑉𝑛𝑗
= 𝛼𝑝𝑛𝑗 + 𝛿0 𝑇𝐹𝑗 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝑗
𝑖
 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘 ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝑗
𝑘
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑖,𝑘𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘 ∗ 𝑇𝐹𝑗
𝑖,𝑘
+ 𝛽𝑥𝑗 + 𝛾𝑑𝑛𝑗  
where pnj is the average price of product j paid in market n, α is the price coefficient, β is a vector 
of coefficients for all other product characteristics, and γ is a vector of coefficients for all 
controlling fixed effects, including region, state, year, month, and brand dummies. The error 
term, nj, is distributed according to i.i.d. Type 1 Extreme Value. Therefore, the closed form of 
the purchase probability or market share for each product in each market Snj is  
𝑆𝑛𝑗 =
exp (𝑉𝑛𝑗)
∑ exp (𝑉𝑛𝑗)𝑗
  , 𝑗 = 1 … 𝐽 
𝑆𝑛0 =
1
∑ exp (𝑉𝑛𝑗)𝑗
 
We nominate the outside option (i.e., all choices except the top 77 brands) as the baseline 
and calculate the log odds for each of the top 77 popcorn brands relative to the baseline, so that 
the difference of the log of each brand’s observed market share and the log of the share of the 
outside good is a linear function of the predictors: 
𝑉𝑛𝑗 = log(𝑆𝑛𝑗) − log(𝑆𝑛0) 
We first use the simplest ordinary least squares approach to estimate our multinomial 
logit model, shown in Model I. For Models II–IV, we then use two-stage least squares estimation 
 70 
 
to deal with price endogeneity. More specifically, Model II uses the first set of Hausman 
instruments (Hausman 1996, Nevo 2001), that is, average prices of popcorn products in other 
markets that are intended as proxies for common cost shocks. Model III uses the second set of 
BLP instruments (Nevo 2001) the rival product characteristic proxies that help reveal 
substitution patterns. Model IV includes both sets of instruments. All models control for region, 
state, year, month, and brand fixed effects. 
2.6 Regression Results 
Table 2.7 offers evidence that consumers have positive demand for trans fat products 
relative to products without trans fat. After the 2006 labeling legislation, demand for trans fat 
products continued to increase significantly, with heterogeneous regional preferences. This result 
is stable across all model estimation results.  
Table 2.7 Multinomial Logit Regression Results 
   Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Variables OLS IV IV IV 
          
Price -3.079*** -2.645*** -10.87*** -2.649*** 
 
(0.0298) (0.0321) (0.988) (0.0321) 
Trans fat (g) 0.0959*** 0.0949*** 0.109*** 0.0949*** 
 
(0.00467) (0.00467) (0.00580) (0.00467) 
2007*Trans fat  0.00513 0.00541 0.00108 0.00541 
 
(0.00633) (0.00633) (0.00757) (0.00633) 
2008*Trans fat  0.0285*** 0.0298*** 0.00727 0.0298*** 
 
(0.00652) (0.00652) (0.00824) (0.00652) 
2009*Trans fat  0.0572*** 0.0591*** 0.0262*** 0.0590*** 
 
(0.00657) (0.00657) (0.00877) (0.00657) 
2010*Trans fat  0.0818*** 0.0843*** 0.0391*** 0.0843*** 
 
(0.00661) (0.00661) (0.00956) (0.00661) 
2011*Trans fat  0.0637*** 0.0675*** -0.00402 0.0674*** 
 
(0.00656) (0.00656) (0.0116) (0.00656) 
2012*Trans fat  0.0747*** 0.0785*** 0.00610 0.0785*** 
 
(0.00648) (0.00648) (0.0116) (0.00648) 
2013*Trans fat  0.0852*** 0.0891*** 0.0174 0.0890*** 
 
(0.00641) (0.00642) (0.0115) (0.00641) 
2014*Trans fat  0.122*** 0.127*** 0.0413*** 0.127*** 
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(0.00642) (0.00642) (0.0128) (0.00642) 
Northeast*Trans fat 0.0487*** 0.0496*** 0.0339*** 0.0496*** 
 
(0.00799) (0.00799) (0.00972) (0.00799) 
Midwest*Trans fat 0.0184*** 0.0186*** 0.0146* 0.0186*** 
 
(0.00676) (0.00676) (0.00808) (0.00676) 
West*Trans fat 0.0361*** 0.0359*** 0.0390*** 0.0359*** 
 
(0.00724) (0.00724) (0.00865) (0.00724) 
2007*Northeast*Trans fat  -0.0115 -0.0117 -0.00786 -0.0117 
 
(0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0133) (0.0112) 
2008*Northeast*Trans fat  -0.0141 -0.0147 -0.00360 -0.0147 
 
(0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0136) (0.0114) 
2009*Northeast*Trans fat  -0.00791 -0.00818 -0.00312 -0.00817 
 
(0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0137) (0.0115) 
2010*Northeast*Trans fat  -0.0128 -0.0133 -0.00418 -0.0133 
 
(0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0138) (0.0115) 
2011*Northeast*Trans fat  -0.00293 -0.00341 0.00509 -0.00341 
 
(0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0137) (0.0115) 
2012*Northeast*Trans fat  -0.0201* -0.0207* -0.00906 -0.0207* 
 
(0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0136) (0.0114) 
2013*Northeast*Trans fat  -0.00208 -0.00261 0.00701 -0.00260 
 
(0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0136) (0.0114) 
2014*Northeast*Trans fat  -0.00371 -0.00439 0.00826 -0.00438 
 
(0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0137) (0.0114) 
2007*Midwest*Trans fat  0.0210** 0.0211** 0.0203* 0.0211** 
 
(0.00940) (0.00940) (0.0112) (0.00940) 
2008*Midwest*Trans fat  0.00710 0.00678 0.0124 0.00678 
 
(0.00955) (0.00955) (0.0114) (0.00955) 
2009*Midwest*Trans fat  -0.0274*** -0.0279*** -0.0180 -0.0279*** 
 
(0.00957) (0.00957) (0.0115) (0.00957) 
2010*Midwest*Trans fat  -0.0367*** -0.0374*** -0.0240** -0.0374*** 
 
(0.00960) (0.00960) (0.0116) (0.00960) 
2011*Midwest*Trans fat  -0.0159* -0.0164* -0.00823 -0.0164* 
 
(0.00962) (0.00962) (0.0115) (0.00962) 
2012*Midwest*Trans fat  -0.0295*** -0.0299*** -0.0222* -0.0299*** 
 
(0.00952) (0.00952) (0.0114) (0.00952) 
2013*Midwest*Trans fat  -0.0285*** -0.0292*** -0.0162 -0.0292*** 
 
(0.00946) (0.00946) (0.0114) (0.00946) 
2014*Midwest*Trans fat  -0.0213** -0.0219** -0.0117 -0.0219** 
 
(0.00949) (0.00949) (0.0114) (0.00949) 
2007*West*Trans fat  0.00916 0.00917 0.00880 0.00917 
 
(0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0120) (0.0101) 
2008*West*Trans fat  0.00318 0.00309 0.00420 0.00310 
 
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0122) (0.0102) 
2009*West*Trans fat  -0.0155 -0.0154 -0.0189 -0.0154 
 
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0121) (0.0102) 
2010*West*Trans fat  -0.0276*** -0.0280*** -0.0227* -0.0280*** 
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(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0122) (0.0102) 
2011*West*Trans fat  -0.0165 -0.0169 -0.00977 -0.0169 
 
(0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0124) (0.0104) 
2012*West*Trans fat  -0.0234** -0.0239** -0.0135 -0.0239** 
 
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0124) (0.0103) 
2013*West*Trans fat  -0.0242** -0.0247** -0.0147 -0.0247** 
 
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0123) (0.0103) 
2014*West*Trans fat  -0.0498*** -0.0504*** -0.0387*** -0.0504*** 
 
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0123) (0.0102) 
Butter 1.394*** 1.421*** 0.908*** 1.421*** 
 
(0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0634) (0.0128) 
Total fat (g) -0.143*** -0.142*** -0.171*** -0.142*** 
 
(0.00386) (0.00387) (0.00583) (0.00387) 
Saturated fat (g) 0.246*** 0.242*** 0.320*** 0.242*** 
 
(0.00229) (0.00229) (0.00978) (0.00229) 
Calories 0.0130*** 0.0129*** 0.0158*** 0.0129*** 
 
(0.000435) (0.000436) (0.000631) (0.000436) 
Sodium (mg) -0.00202*** -0.00201*** -0.00231*** -0.00201*** 
 
(2.22e-05) (2.22e-05) (4.52e-05) (2.22e-05) 
Total carbohydrate (g) 0.0606*** 0.0600*** 0.0621*** 0.0600*** 
 
(0.00214) (0.00214) (0.00256) (0.00214) 
Dietary fiber (g) 0.0105** 0.0157*** -0.0598*** 0.0156*** 
 
(0.00414) (0.00414) (0.0102) (0.00414) 
Protein (g) -0.128*** -0.134*** -0.0220 -0.134*** 
 
(0.00460) (0.00461) (0.0145) (0.00461) 
Sugars (g) -0.103*** -0.101*** -0.128*** -0.101*** 
 
(0.00168) (0.00168) (0.00380) (0.00168) 
Constant -15.47*** -15.07*** -15.24*** -15.08*** 
 
(0.0884) (0.0883) (0.107) (0.0883) 
     Observations 161,230 161,220 161,230 161,220 
R-squared 0.421 0.420 0.174 0.420 
Price Instruments No Yes No Yes 
Product Instruments No No Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Brand FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Saragan p-val   0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
All other flavor and nutrient coefficients are statistically significant and of the expected 
sign. It is interesting to note that popcorn marketed as “butter” noticeably increases demand; 
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taste parameters for saturated fat also have a positive effect. However, consumers value total fat 
in a negative way, with a smaller magnitude than saturated fat. Moreover, the marginal 
valuations of calorie, total carbohydrates, and dietary fiber are positive, while the marginal 
valuations of sodium, sugar, and protein are negative. In other words, a consumer with average 
demographic characteristics prefers popcorn products with higher calories, total carbohydrates, 
and dietary fiber but tends to avoid popcorn products with higher sodium, sugar, and protein.  
In addition, we plot changes in WTP for trans fat, 
𝛿
𝛼
, over time in different regions. More 
specifically, average WTP for trans fat in 2006 is $0.055 per g of product in the Northeast, 
$0.043 per g in the Midwest, $0.049 per g in the West, and $0.036 per g in the South. These 
positive coefficients imply that individuals would be willing to pay around $0.04, on average, to 
consume popcorn with 1 more gram of trans fat given the same utility obtained. 
Figure 2.6 Willingness to Pay for Trans Fat by Region and Year 
  
Over time, we observed an increasing trend in WTP for trans fat in all states. The average 
WTP for trans fat increased by 85%, to $0.101 in 2014 in the Northeast. Similarly, the average 
WTP for trans fat increased by 93% in the Midwest (to $0.083 in 2014), by 134% in the South 
(to $0.084), and by 59% in the West (to $0.078). In general, people in Northeast are willing to 
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pay more for trans fat taste than those in other regions. 
2.7 Conclusions 
In this paper, we explore consumers’ willingness to pay for trans fat using scanner data 
on purchases of microwavable popcorn from 2006 to 2014, after the introduction of mandatory 
trans fat labeling. We estimate how a change in trans fat content affects consumer demand for 
popcorn products with and without trans fat.  
Our product-level multinomial logit model results suggest that, on average, trans fat 
content increases consumer demand, with significant regional preference heterogeneity. 
Consumers in the Northeast have a higher preference for trans fat popcorn than those in the other 
regions. In addition, we found evidence that this positive preference for trans fat has become 
increasingly stronger over time, even after the 2006 mandatory labeling rule. This implies that 
consumers actually value the taste of trans fat over the health concerns caused by trans fats.
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CHAPTER 3  
SPILLOVER MECHANISMS OF WIC INFANT FORMULA REBATE PROGRAM 
3.1 Introduction 
After food stamps and school lunches, the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for 
Women, Infants and Children (WIC), established in 1972, is the third-largest food assistance 
program in the United States. WIC provides vouchers to low-income pregnant women, mothers, 
and their children up to age 5 for a variety of foods. Infant formula represents the largest cost to 
WIC: 57%–68% of all infant formula sold in the United States is purchased through the program 
(Oliveira et al. 2010). To reduce costs, state WIC programs began an infant formula rebate 
system in 1987. This competitive bidding system awards a single-source contract to the firm that 
offers the lowest net price (i.e., wholesale price minus the rebate bid). The rebates are typically 
about 85% of the wholesale price, which reduces WIC food costs by about $1.7 billion a year. 
As WIC contracts assure a large amount of program-specific formula sales, previous 
literature suggests that winning manufacturers enjoy spillover on their non–WIC formula market 
shares. That is, they benefit from indirect sale increases in the non–WIC market (Oliveira, 
Frazão, and Smallwood 2011; Huang and Perloff 2014). Spillover effects can also exist through 
price strategies (Chernew et al. 2010). To maximize profit, manufacturers that win the WIC bid 
may decrease prices in the more price-sensitive toddler formula market while increasing prices in 
the infant formula market, where WIC sales are guaranteed. However, price premiums may still 
exist for losing companies even after contract changes.  
The purpose of this paper is to explain why manufacturers compete aggressively on their 
rebates to win WIC contracts. As spillovers are one of the forces that shape the market over time, 
we pay particular attention in this paper to correctly identifying and estimating distinct spillover 
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mechanisms and to understanding the features of consumer purchasing behavior that drive 
spillover patterns. 
3.2 Literature Review 
In general, literature suggests that the WIC infant formula rebate program has a 
significant spillover effect on sales by volume. The manufacturer that wins a WIC contract 
experiences increased sales in the non–WIC formula market (an indirect effect). That is, the 
benefits of being the exclusive formula provider for WIC participants extend to increasing the 
winning manufacturer’s share of non–WIC sales. Davis (2011) finds a 50%–60% increase in a 
brand’s market share of non–WIC sales after that formula becomes the WIC–contract brand.  
The spillover effect may work through several mechanisms. First, since WIC subsidizes 
nearly half of infants born in the United States, it is in retailers’ best interest to secure guaranteed 
WIC sales by making the WIC brand most easily visible to WIC participants. The WIC–contract 
brand may therefore gain greater shelf space and better product placement in retail stores, which 
may also drive its sales to non–WIC consumers. In an interview conducted by the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (2006), three bidding infant formula manufacturers noted the 
importance of shelf space and product placement to their marketing strategies. Further, many 
studies have found that better shelf allocation was associated with greater purchase percentage 
(Frank and Massy 1970; Drèze Hoch, and Purk 1994; Sigurdsson, Saevarsson, and Foxall 2009).  
Second, sales may also rise from hospital and physician recommendations of WIC–brand 
formula, since they are more likely to recommend the WIC brand to non–WIC consumers (GAO 
1998; Oliveira et al. 2010, 2011). Knowing that most WIC participants are required to use the 
WIC–brand infant formula, physicians may recommend that brand to all patients. Hospitals may 
also provide free samples of WIC–brand formula to all new mothers without differentiating 
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between WIC and non–WIC consumers (GAO 2006).  
Third, WIC logos on shelf labels may be viewed as the government’s tacit endorsement 
of the product, increasing the product’ credibility among non–WIC consumers Huang and 
Perloff (2014) report that winning manufacturers sometimes use the trademarked WIC logo in 
their promotional materials because of the positive labeling effect. 
Fourth, WIC participants are more likely to buy WIC–brand formula out of pocket when 
they use up WIC formula vouchers and after they exit WIC. Once the WIC infants are doing well 
on the contract-brand formula, their mothers may be reluctant to feed them a different brand, 
since new formulas may cause stomach upset and gas.  
Fifth, spillover may come from WIC recipients’ recommendations to non–WIC friends 
and relatives. Lastly, mothers may be more likely to buy the WIC brand of toddler formula after 
their infants reach 1 year of age (Oliveira, Frazão, and Smallwood 2011).  
Chernew, Baicker, and Martin (2010) review the literature examining the impact of 
public-sector (i.e., Medicare or Medicaid) fee reductions on prices charged to private payers. 
They find that dynamic cost shifting could account for price spillover effect (Sloan and Becker 
1984; Lynk 1995; CBO 1993; ProPAC 1995a,b; Sheils 2009). Dynamic cost shifting—in which 
payers in one sector pay more because those in another sector pay less—is different from static 
cost shifting or price discrimination—in which different customers are charged different prices 
for the same service or product. But both dynamic and static cost shifting are pricing strategies 
that allow providers with market power to charge a higher price for payers with less elastic 
demand. Similarly, dynamic cost shifting could occur in the WIC formula bid system. To 
maximize profit, contract-winning manufacturers would decrease wholesale prices for toddler 
formula because they can increase wholesale prices for infant formula. The toddler formula 
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market is not subsidized by any government programs and is therefore a more competitive 
market, with all customers sensitive to price changes. However, a large fraction of infant formula 
purchasers are WIC participants, who use food vouchers and do not pay for formula out of 
pocket. With these price-insensitive consumers in the infant formula market, it is in the best 
interest of the winning manufacturer to exercise its market power to capture large markups from 
non–WIC infant formula consumers. Empirical studies on infant formula wholesale prices show 
mixed results. While Davis (2011) argue that WIC does not affect wholesale prices, while Prell 
et al. (2004) find that WIC distorts them.  
Considerable research has been conducted on retail prices. Using a sample from 1994 to 
2000, Oliveira et al. (2004) conclude that WIC–contract brands are associated with modestly 
higher retail prices in supermarkets. Oliveira et al. (2001) find the prices for the WIC–contract 
brand milk-based powder formula exceed those for non-contract brands in 23 of 55 of market 
areas (42%). No consistent relationship exists between a formula's being the WIC–contract brand 
and having the highest average retail price within market areas. Oliveira, Frazão and Smallwood 
(2011) report that the percentage price change for the winning WIC brand is greater than for the 
losing brand in 12 of 23 states between the year prior to and the year after the contract change, 
while the reverse is true for the remaining 11 states. On average, the relative retail price of the 
winning WIC brand to the losing brand increased by less than 2%, suggesting that the shift in 
market share from losing manufacturer to winning manufacturer was not due to a decrease in the 
relative retail prices but rather to the change in contract-brand status. 
3.3 Data Description 
To study WIC spillover effects, we use large-scale Nielsen retail scanner datasets from 
the Kilts Center for Marketing, which were prepared by the Booth School of Business from 
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University of Chicago. The Nielsen market-panel database contains weekly purchase and pricing 
data from more than 90 participating grocery stores, including Stop & Shop and Big Y. This 
particular study focuses on milk-based powder formula; about 80% of all infant formula sold is 
milk-based, and approximately 85% of those sales are in powder form.  
Further, we aggregate store-level data by state for the three types of milk-based powder 
formula: Top WIC–contract brand infant formula, non–WIC infant formula, and toddler formula. 
Top WIC infant formula is defined as the WIC–contract brand with the largest sales by volume 
in the market. All other infant formulas except the top WIC infant formula are categorized as 
non–WIC formula. Missing data points for manufacturers’ name and formula sizes were fixed by 
incorporating information from the New Product Launch database and checking product 
websites. Each formula product line was identified through the official WIC formula list 
provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)10 and further confirmed by double-
checking the dataset, where the introduction of a new generation of the same formula product 
line coincides with the discontinuation of the old one. For example, Similac Advance was 
previously called Similac Advance Early Shield, so these two brands are considered to be the 
same product line.  
Other complementary databases used in this study include the WIC rebate database 
collected by Davis (2016), which has information on 11 contracts in 24 states where one firm 
replaced another as the WIC supplier between 2007 and 2013. For each state, the data span 1 
year before and 2 years after each contract change. State-level summary statistics from the 2007–
2011 American Community Survey are also incorporated to control for demographic differences. 
To capture state-specific demand trends, we also include the annual number of live births from 
the Centers for Disease Control. 
                                                 
10 The list was obtained from the USDA WICWorks website. https://wicworks.fns.usda.gov/databases  
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Table 3.1 shows the details of the 11 WIC contracts. For example, California experienced 
a contract change on August 1, 2007, when Mead Johnson Nutrition Co. replaced Abbott Lab as 
the contract winner. Some states—such as Texas, Iowa and Minnesota—form alliances and make 
joint WIC bids. During the sample period, Pennsylvania had two contract changes, in 2008 and 
in 2013.  
Table 3.1 Milk-Based Powder Infant Formula WIC Contract Changes 
 
State 
Contract 
begin 
date 
Previo
us 
winner 
Curre
nt 
winner 
California 8/1/2007 A MJ 
Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Maryland, 
Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington, 
West Virginia 
10/1/2007 MJ A 
Louisiana 10/1/2007 A MJ 
Texas, Iowa, Minnesota 10/1/2007 MJ A 
Colorado 1/1/2008 A MJ 
Illinois 2/1/2008 A MJ 
Pennsylvania 10/1/2008 A N 
Arkansas, New Mexico, North Carolina 10/1/2012 MJ N 
New Jersey 10/1/2012 A MJ 
North Dakota 7/1/2013 N MJ 
Pennsylvania 10/1/2013 N A 
Note: A denotes Abbott Lab; MJ denotes Mead Johnson Nutrition Co; N 
denotes Nestle Sa. 
 
Table 3.2 summarizes the control variables used in the regression analysis. Generally, the 
sample statistics match national averages. For instance, the mean of average household size 
across 24 states is 2.6, while the 2010 national average household size was 2.58. The sample 
mean of median household income is $52,900, while the 2013 national median household 
income was around $52,000. On average, 9.88% of families have incomes below the poverty 
level; 86.77% of the population have a high school diploma and 27.64% of the population have a 
bachelors degree; 60.56% of mothers are in the labor force. The population is 78.84% white, 
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9.13% black, 3.5% Asian, and 14.17% Hispanic. The mean of median age is around 37, and an 
average of 6.79% of the population under 5 years of age.  
The birth growth rate, which changes annually, is calculated as the ratio of the number of 
live births in the current year to that in the previous year. As shown in Table 3.2, the average 
birth growth rate is 1 across all states and years, with a range of 0.93–1.08. This implies the 
number of births in the sample is relatively stable, so we expect decreasing demand for formula 
due to recent increases in the rate of breastfeeding,11 The mean WIC ratio is 46.4%, meaning that 
on average approximately 46 out of 100 newborn babies are subsidized by WIC. We observe 
some variation in the size of the WIC ratio, with a range of 25.7%–64.6%.  
Table 3.2 Summary Statistics of Variables Included in Regression Analysis 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Average household size 24 2.58 0.17 2.30 3.06 
Median household income 24 52.92 8.43 39.55 72.42 
Poverty (%) 24 9.88 2.46 6.06 14.37 
College (%) 24 27.64 4.77 17.62 36.29 
High school (%)  24 86.77 3.52 80.43 91.59 
Mother in labor force (%) 24 60.56 6.42 49.10 73.73 
Hispanic (%) 24 14.17 12.37 1.19 45.86 
White (%) 24 78.84 10.27 59.22 94.05 
Black (%) 24 9.13 9.10 0.45 31.88 
Asian (%) 24 3.50 2.92 0.61 13.05 
Median age 24 36.79 2.39 29.10 41.10 
Children under 5 (%) 24 6.79 0.78 5.64 9.53 
Number of births 99 1.00 0.03 0.93 1.08 
WIC ratio (%) 99 46.40 0.09 25.70 64.60 
 
One limitation of this study is that the demographic variables do not change over time, as 
they came from the 5-year ACS and have only 1 observation per state. We use a 5-year 
demographic survey rather than a 1-year survey because the 5-year survey data is more 
                                                 
11 https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2013/p0731-breastfeeding-rates.html 
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comprehensive, covers a much larger population, and provides more reliable estimates than the 
1-year short-term survey. Since demographic changes are very slow, a static demographic 
variable may work as well as a dynamic one.  
3.4 Models 
3.4.1 Multinomial Logit for Market Share 
Our multinomial logit model contains 𝑠 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑆 states that experienced a WIC infant 
formula contract change between 2007 and 2013. In each state, we observe market share for each 
of the 𝑗 = 1, ⋯ , 𝐽 manufacturers in 𝑡 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑇 weeks from 1 year before to 2 years after each 
contract change. We denote manufacturer 𝑗’s market share in state 𝑠 and week 𝑡 (McFadden 
1974) as  
𝑆𝑗𝑠𝑡 =
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝛼𝑗 + 𝑋𝑠𝑡
′ 𝛾𝑗 + 𝑍𝑠
′𝛿𝑗
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝛼𝑗 + 𝑋𝑠𝑡′ 𝛾𝑗 + 𝑍𝑠′𝛿𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
, 
where predictors 𝑋𝑠𝑡 include time dummy variables that reflect WIC infant formula contract 
changes, annual birth growth rate, and the ratio of WIC infants to total live births; 𝑍𝑠 denote state 
demographics; 𝛼𝑗 is a constant; and 𝛾𝑗 and 𝛿𝑗 are vectors of WIC-relevant and demographic-
regression coefficients, respectively, for 𝑗 = 1, ⋯ , 𝐽. We know that ∑ 𝑆𝑗𝑠𝑡 = 1
𝐽
𝑗=1  for each unique 
combination of state 𝑠 and week 𝑡 (i.e., the total market shares add up to 1 in a given state for a 
particular week). Therefore, once we know the market shares of the winning and losing 
manufacturers, we automatically know the market share of all other manufacturers by 
subtraction. We transform our multinomial logit model into its log-linear equivalent. We further 
assume the log odds of the winning and losing manufacturers relative to the baseline, all other 
manufacturers, to be a linear function of all explanatory variables:  
𝜂𝑗𝑠𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑆𝑗𝑠𝑡
𝑆𝐽𝑠𝑡
= 𝛼𝑗 − 𝛼𝐽 + 𝑋𝑠𝑡
′ 𝛾𝑗 − 𝛾𝐽 + 𝑍𝑠
′𝛿𝑗 − 𝛿𝐽 + 𝜖𝑗𝑠𝑡 
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= 𝛼𝑗
∗+𝑋𝑠𝑡
′ 𝛾𝑗
∗ + 𝑍𝑠
′𝛿𝑗
∗ + 𝜖𝑗𝑠𝑡 
𝜖𝑗𝑠𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) 
We also include brand dummy variables that indicate whether Abbott Lab or Mead Johnson 
Nutrition Co. held the WIC contract in a given week and in a specific state, while Nestlé and all 
other small manufacturers constitute the residual category. We fit our model using OLS 
regression and separately model each of the three types of formula: the top WIC brand, non–
WIC infant formula, and toddler formula. We do not separately identify all coefficients for 𝑗 =
1, ⋯ , 𝐽, but we can get estimates for the differences between corresponding coefficients (i.e., 𝛼𝑗
∗, 
𝛾𝑗
∗, 𝛿𝑗
∗ for 𝑗 = 1, ⋯ , 𝐽 − 1) that allow us to back up the market shares for all manufacturers.   
3.4.2 OLS for Price  
Spillover could also exist through price channel. To maximize profit, contract–winning 
manufacturers may decrease prices in the more price-sensitive toddler formula market and 
increase prices in the less price-sensitive infant formula market, where WIC sales are guaranteed. 
To determine whether there price spillover occurs, we model simple average prices as a linear 
function of predictors 𝑋𝑠𝑡 that include time dummy variables reflecting WIC infant formula 
contract changes and the ratio of WIC infants to total live births and state demographics 𝑍𝑠: 
𝑃𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽 + 𝑋𝑠𝑡
′ 𝜃 + 𝑍𝑠
′ 𝜂 + 𝜇𝑠𝑡 
𝜇𝑠𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) 
where 𝛽 is a constant, and 𝜃 and 𝜂 are vectors of WIC relevant and demographic regression 
coefficients, respectively, for 𝑗 = 1, ⋯ , 𝐽. Again, we model the three types of formula separately. 
3.4.3 Estimated Manufacturing Profit 
Total revenues can be calculated as retail prices multiplied by total volume sold: 
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𝑅𝑗𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑅𝑗𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒 =
𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒 ∗
𝑇𝑉𝑗𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑗𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑉𝑗𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒 ∗ 𝑆𝑗𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒  
where R denotes revenue, P denotes price, TV denotes total volume sold, S denotes market share, 
and 𝑡 denotes time period for 0–24, 3–6, 6–12, 12–18, and 18–24 months. Thus, revenues after 
the contract change can be estimated based on predicted retail price 𝑃𝑗?̂? and predicted market 
share 𝑆𝑗?̂?, adjusted by the actual total volume of sales in the market before and after the contract 
change across 24 states: 
𝑅𝑗?̂?
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑅𝑗𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒 =
𝑃𝑗?̂?
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒 ∗
𝑇𝑉𝑗𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑗?̂?
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑉𝑗𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒 ∗ 𝑆𝑗𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒  
=
𝑃𝑗?̂?
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒
∗
𝑆𝑗?̂?
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒
 
Lastly, manufacturer profit was separated from predicted revenue in hopes of quantifying the 
spillover effects.  
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡̂  
= {
(?̂? − 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝̂ ) ∗ (1 − 𝑅𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒)̂ − 𝐶𝑜𝑠?̂? 𝑊𝐼𝐶
?̂? − 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝̂ − 𝐶𝑜𝑠?̂?  𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑊𝐼𝐶, 𝑇𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑟
 
We made several assumptions based on previous literature: Manufacturing cost was assumed to 
be 20% of total revenue sales, as retail prices were estimated to be five times the cost of 
manufacture in 1994 (Richter 2001). Retail markup was estimated to be around 13% of retail 
price in 2004 (Oliveira and Davis 2006). Rebates are set at 85% of the 2008 wholesale price 
(Oliveira et al. 2010): 
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡̂ = {
(?̂? − 0.13𝑅)̂ ∗ 0.15 − 0.2?̂? 𝑊𝐼𝐶
?̂? − 0.13?̂? − 0.2?̂?  𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑊𝐼𝐶, 𝑇𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑟
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3.5 Descriptive Results 
One big challenge is to correctly identify the top WIC brand, since there is no 
comprehensive dataset that distinguishes WIC–brand and non–WIC infant formulas in each state. 
However, two important features help identify WIC infant formula: 1) WIC brands only come in 
sizes between 12 oz. and 13 oz. and 2) the top WIC brand in each state shows a unique pattern in 
the data different from that of all other brands. For example, in California, the winning 
manufacturer stole a chunk of sales from the losing manufacturer immediately after the WIC 
contract change (Figure 3.1). All 24 states in our sample showed similar patterns after a contract 
change. This is likely due to greater shelf space, better product placement, and the advantages of 
carrying WIC labels. The top WIC brand was assumed to be the only WIC brand as (on average) 
it accounts for 76.1% of all WIC-size infant formula sales across 24 states. Interestingly, both 
winning and losing manufacturers significantly increased their prices shortly after the contract 
change and remained at that level.   
Figure 3.1 Market Share and Price Change for Top No. 1 WIC Brand in California 
 
 
 
The non–WIC infant formula market is defined as all infant formula except the top WIC 
brand. Figure 3.2 shows that the winning manufacturer took over the lead around 10 weeks after 
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the contract change, but its average price of non–WIC infant formula increased significantly just 
after the contract change. 
Figure 3.2 Market Share and Price Change for Non-WIC Infant Formula in California 
 
 
A similar pattern was not observed in the toddler formula market. It took more than 1 
year for that shift to happen. The average price of toddler formula for the winning manufacturer 
decreased occasionally after the contract change, suggesting that consumers may have become 
loyal purchasers of the brand, so the losing manufacturer was still able to enjoy a spillover effect. 
Figure 3.3 Market Share and Price Change for Toddler Formula in California 
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3.6 Regression Results 
Table 3.3 shows multinomial logit regression results of market share for the top WIC 
brand, non–WIC infant formula, and toddler formula. As shown in Table 3.3, most coefficients 
of interest—a contract change dummy to capture overall WIC effect and four time dummies to 
distinguish potential short-run and long-run impacts—are statistically significant and have the 
expected signs.  
Table 3.3 Multinomial Regression without Price by Formulas Type 
 
Variable 
top WIC Brand Non-WIC Infant Toddler 
Winner Loser Winner Loser Winner Loser 
Constant 7.469 -2.176 -9.543 -40.199** 21.884 -29.107 
 23.348 13.889 19.422 14.454 23.799 25.783 
Contract change 3.674*** -1.411*** 0.742*** -0.236*** 0.638*** 0.379*** 
 0.160 0.093 0.159 0.070 0.164 0.090 
3m<t<6m 0.298*** -0.719*** 0.212*** -0.203*** 0.242*** -0.005 
 0.091 0.098 0.073 0.057 0.086 0.118 
6m<t<12m 0.304*** -1.175*** 0.394*** -0.294*** 0.214** -0.247* 
 0.105 0.111 0.085 0.065 0.100 0.134 
12m<t<18m 0.447*** -1.130*** 0.531*** -0.330*** 0.338** -0.319 
 0.118 0.141 0.098 0.089 0.129 0.199 
18m<t<24m 0.228 -1.607*** 0.606*** -0.429*** 0.288* -0.529* 
 0.158 0.172 0.125 0.118 0.156 0.264 
Average household size -5.458* -5.665*** -4.656** -4.864** -4.228 -5.528 
 2.679 1.874 2.023 2.037 2.523 3.751 
Median household income -0.136 -0.109* 0.072 0.040 0.032 0.011 
 0.084 0.061 0.086 0.058 0.083 0.091 
Poverty (%) -0.458** -0.537*** 0.097 -0.045 0.146 -0.104 
 0.218 0.132 0.272 0.135 0.300 0.185 
College (%) 0.192** 0.190*** -0.025 0.013 0.075 0.046 
 0.082 0.056 0.081 0.040 0.051 0.057 
High school (%)  -0.276* -0.349*** 0.028 0.007 -0.148 -0.038 
 0.146 0.088 0.156 0.111 0.148 0.186 
Mother in labor force (%) -0.093** -0.085*** -0.055 -0.078*** -0.016 -0.055 
 0.039 0.026 0.036 0.023 0.041 0.040 
Hispanic (%) 0.026 0.001 0.006 0.012 -0.072** -0.059 
 0.027 0.016 0.028 0.025 0.034 0.044 
White (%) 0.146** 0.055 0.054 0.020 -0.052 -0.105 
 0.065 0.042 0.050 0.036 0.058 0.070 
Black (%) 0.190*** 0.090** 0.058 0.042 -0.052 -0.089 
 0.064 0.042 0.054 0.046 0.067 0.091 
Asian (%) 0.360*** 0.181* 0.150 0.143* 0.134 0.107 
 0.122 0.090 0.089 0.069 0.124 0.151 
Median age 0.428 0.855*** 0.079 0.793*** -0.046 0.826*** 
 0.302 0.212 0.258 0.185 0.257 0.276 
Children under 5 (%) 2.240** 3.662*** 0.870 3.081*** 0.607 3.650** 
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 1.015 0.693 1.025 0.840 1.078 1.324 
Number of births -4.108 -2.213 2.796 1.488 1.180 2.014 
 4.934 3.020 3.947 2.526 3.823 4.919 
WIC brand is Mead Johnson 0.421 1.046*** 0.395 0.541*** 0.804** 0.140 
 0.289 0.221 0.352 0.150 0.328 0.194 
WIC brand is Abbott lab 0.643** 0.927*** 0.706** 0.430** 0.816** 0.013 
 0.264 0.257 0.310 0.181 0.320 0.244 
WIC ratio (%) 0.902 1.664 2.549 3.772*** -3.432 5.332** 
 2.053 1.261 1.992 1.291 2.678 2.157 
Number of observations 7750 7750 7750 
LR Ratio 15750.88 8159.38 4616.57 
Prob LR 0 0 0 
pseudo R2 0.875 0.651 0.473 
adj. pseudo R2 0.874 0.649 0.470 
Degrees of freedom 42 42 42 
 
 
Table 3.4 exhibits simple OLS regression results for retail price using the same set of 
predictors used in the market share regressions. Holding all other variables constant, the winning 
manufacturer significantly increased prices of infant formula by more than $0.05/oz. and 
decreased prices of toddler formula by $0.07/oz. just after WIC contract change. The losing 
manufacturer seemed to follow the winner’s strategy. Results are robust among different setups 
when different control variables are included. 
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Table 3.4 OLS Regression for Prices by Formula Type  
 
Variable 
WIC Infant Non-WIC Infant Toddler 
Winner Loser Winner Loser Winner Loser 
Constant 3.082 2.82 4.225** 0.322 -1.78 0.605 
 2.811 2.786 1.78 1.6 1.287 1.513 
Contract change 0.055*** 0.046*** 0.069*** 0.040*** -0.007 -0.020** 
 0.009 0.011 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.007 
3m<t<6m 0.017*** 0.007 0.018*** 0 -0.001 0.034*** 
 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.007 
6m<t<12m 0.022*** 0.018** 0.022*** 0.005 -0.005 0.042*** 
 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.009 0.007 
12m<t<18m 0.033*** 0.029** 0.029*** 0.011* -0.005 0.044*** 
 0.007 0.013 0.007 0.006 0.009 0.009 
18m<t<24m 0.052*** 0.037** 0.033*** -0.003 0.018 0.034*** 
 0.011 0.016 0.011 0.01 0.012 0.011 
Average household size -0.059 0.037 0 -0.236 0.434** -0.019 
 0.276 0.288 0.189 0.155 0.17 0.096 
Median household income 0.012 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.011** 
 0.009 0.01 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.004 
Poverty (%) 0.036 0.038 0.033 0.012 0.016 0.034* 
 0.035 0.034 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.019 
College (%) -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.017** -0.001 
 0.006 0.008 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.003 
High school (%)  -0.02 -0.018 -0.018 -0.013 0.042*** -0.005 
 0.019 0.019 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.007 
Mother in labor force (%) 0.007* 0.007* 0.006** 0.001 -0.001 0.003 
 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Hispanic (%) -0.008* -0.008* -0.006* -0.004 0.007*** -0.002 
 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
White (%) -0.014* -0.013* -0.008 -0.007 0.008* 0.001 
 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Black (%) -0.018* -0.015* -0.01 -0.008 0.008* -0.002 
 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004 
Asian (%) -0.021 -0.013 -0.012 -0.006 -0.001 0 
 0.015 0.014 0.01 0.007 0.007 0.008 
Median age 0.008 0.008 -0.025 0.044** -0.049** -0.008 
 0.03 0.033 0.018 0.02 0.022 0.014 
Children under 5 (%) 0.017 0.012 -0.081 0.163** -0.251** -0.039 
 0.119 0.122 0.078 0.076 0.093 0.046 
Number of births -0.168 -0.27 -0.281* 0.006 0.652** 0.409** 
 0.293 0.338 0.162 0.18 0.237 0.17 
WIC brand is Mead Johnson -0.081* -0.079** -0.044 -0.059*** 0.033* -0.038** 
 0.04 0.035 0.032 0.02 0.017 0.014 
WIC brand is Abbott lab -0.083* -0.078* -0.038 -0.058** 0.011 -0.015 
 0.046 0.042 0.036 0.025 0.013 0.011 
WIC ratio (%) -0.539* -0.570* -0.514** -0.076 0.234* -0.394** 
 0.309 0.303 0.189 0.171 0.136 0.167 
Number of observations 3,875 3,875 3,875 3,875 3,875 3,875 
F statistic 247.02 124.18 363.67 81.74 38.36 40.35 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R2 0.559 0.545 0.672 0.511 0.379 0.431 
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Table 3.5 shows the predicted changes in market share by formula type. We find that, the 
winner experiences a significant increase in market share for all three types of formula 
immediately after WIC contract change. While the losing manufacturer experiences a sharp 
decrease in market share for all infant products, its market share in the toddler formula market 
only begins to decrease significantly around 6 months after a WIC contract changes. Over time, 
the winner’s share in non–WIC infant formula sales increases, while the losing manufacturer 
experiences the opposite; this pattern suggests the presence of an important long-run spillover 
effect.  
Table 3.5 Estimated Market Share over Time by Formula Type 
 
  
Top WIC Brand Non-WIC Infant Toddler 
Winner Loser Winner Loser Winner Loser 
Pre change 0.03 0.94 0.20 0.65 0.22 0.57 
Post change 0.82 0.16 0.39 0.47 0.28 0.57 
3m<t<6m 0.92 0.06 0.48 0.38 0.34 0.53 
6m<t<12m 0.94 0.04 0.54 0.33 0.37 0.47 
12m<t<18m 0.95 0.04 0.58 0.30 0.42 0.43 
18m<t<24m 0.95 0.03 0.62 0.26 0.44 0.39 
 
Table 3.6 Estimated Price over Time by Formula Type 
 
Time Period 
Top WIC Brand Non-WIC Infant Toddler 
Winner Loser Winner Loser Winner Loser 
Pre change 1.06 1.07 0.99 1.03 0.86 0.85 
Post change 1.12 1.11 1.05 1.07 0.85 0.84 
3m<t<6m 1.13 1.12 1.07 1.07 0.85 0.87 
6m<t<12m 1.14 1.13 1.08 1.08 0.85 0.88 
12m<t<18m 1.15 1.14 1.08 1.08 0.85 0.88 
18m<t<24m 1.17 1.15 1.09 1.07 0.87 0.87 
 
Predicted prices suggest that the top WIC infant formula is the highest-priced formula 
among the three types, with toddler formula being the least expensive. Winning manufacturers 
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increased the price of all infant formulas. At the same time, toddler formula prices decreased by 
about $0.01/oz. over the first 18 months after winning the contract.  
An important finding in Table 3.7 is that, immediately after contract change, both winning 
and losing manufacturers made around $20 million more than they had prior to the change. The 
winning manufacturer continued to make more money, while the losing manufacturer’s profit 
decreased over time for all three types of formula. The evidence seems to justify the substantial 
discounts manufacturers give WIC. Last, the spillover effect was estimated to be larger in the 
non–WIC infant formula market than in the toddler market, as the non–WIC infant formula 
enjoyed a much larger market.  
Table 3.7 Estimated Annual Manufacturer Profit over Time by Formula Type in $Million 
 
Time Period 
Top WIC Brand Non-WIC Infant Toddler Total 
Winner Loser Winner Loser Winner Loser Winner Loser 
Pre change 6.48 -19.08 43.21 109.96 7.09 10.06 56.78 100.94 
Post change -19.41 32.62 85.93 79.82 10.95 11.82 77.47 124.26 
3m<t<6m -22.86 13.77 109.10 65.77 12.84 11.27 99.08 90.81 
6m<t<12m -22.93 8.75 121.90 56.04 13.92 10.00 112.88 74.79 
12m<t<18m -23.00 7.97 131.47 50.71 16.34 9.68 124.81 68.36 
18m<t<24m -22.34 5.92 138.89 44.31 17.47 8.49 134.02 58.73 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
We use large-scale Nielsen retail scanner data to study WIC’s impact on the market for 
milk-based powder formula from 2007 to 2013. While controlling for demographic differences 
and state-specific demand trends, we identify spillover patterns by observing market share and 
pricing changes before and after each contract change for three types of infant formulas and for 
both WIC contract winners and losers. 
This paper contributes to previous studies by, first, identifying the top WIC brands that 
make up almost all WIC formula sales in each state. Second, using multinomial logit models 
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based on Huang and Perloff (2014), we find different spillover patterns by comparing three types 
of formula. In particular, immediately after the contract change, the winning manufacturer 
experiences a significant increase in market share for all three types of formula due to greater 
shelf space, better product placement, the advantages of carrying WIC labels.  
While the loser’s market share for the top WIC infant formula and all other infant 
formula promptly decrease, the loser’s market share in the toddler formula market continues to 
increase and only begins to decrease around 18 months after WIC contract changes. This 
suggests that losing manufacturers still enjoy a spillover effect because of consumers’ brand 
loyal purchases. Over time, the spillover effect increases the winner’s share and decreases the 
loser’s share for all other infant formula, which may reflect the combined impact of 
recommendations from physicians and WIC participants. Lastly, we observe that winning 
manufacturers increase prices for top WIC and all other infant formulas and decrease toddler 
formula prices over time. A spillover effect helps the losing manufacturer to continue increasing 
its prices for all three types of formula for at least 2 years after contract changes.  
In conclusion, this study finds evidence that significant spillover effects through multiple 
channels drive manufacturers to win WIC infant rebate contracts. Winning manufacturers can 
make considerably more money in the non–WIC market to compensate for the loss in the WIC 
market, mainly because manufacturing costs are so small, leaving room for large profit margins. 
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